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Trade-Based Remedies for Copyright
Infringement: Utilizing a "LossPreventative" Synthesis
by
ANTOINETTE M. VON DEM HAGEN*

Introduction
[Tjhere is only one ideology [governing trade issues] available today.
This ideology frames the trade debate in terms of free trade or unfair
trade. Only if foreign practicesfall into these categories do claims for
protection become legitimate.'

A recent study by the International Trade Commission (ITC) concluded that foreign piracy of intellectual property has assumed monumental proportions, with aggregate U.S. business losses due to
inadequate intellectual property protection worldwide estimated at $23.8
billion in 1986.2 Over the past fifteen years, concern has grown commensurately with increased losses, reflecting two factors.3 First, losses attributable to piracy have expanded along with a marked growth in
international trade, increased production capabilities in countries with
inadequate intellectual property protection, and the United States' expansion into foreign markets and production sites.4 Second, U.S. businesses are increasingly aware of the importance of intellectual property
protection to profitability.' Assuming no improvements are made in in*
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1. Borrus & Goldstein, United States Trade Protectionism:Institutions, Norms, and Practices, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 328, 335 (1987).
2. Foreign Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and the Effect of U.S. Industry and
Trade (1988), USITC Pub. 2065, Inv. No. 332-245 (Feb. 1988) [hereinafter ITC REPORT].
Other principal findings were: (1) 245 of the responding 431 firms reported sales of $1.114
trillion, 80% of which were directly affected by intellectual property rights; (2) the largest
worldwide losses resulted from lost revenues from fees and royalties, reduced profit margins,
displacement by infringing imports, damage to reputations, and business never attempted
abroad, in that order; and (3) other adverse effects included lost U.S. exports, lost U.S. jobs,
and identification and enforcement costs. Id. at vii-viii.
3. Eighty-four percent of the respondents indicated that losses resulting from inadequate
intellectual property protection have "grown greatly" or "grown moderately" during the past
15 years. Id. at Table 5-1.
4. Id. at 5-1.
5. Id.
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losses are expected to

continue. 6
An April 1989 report released by the International Intellectual
Property Alliance (IIPA) singled out twelve nations as the most egregious violators of the rights of U.S. copyright holders, with responsibility

for $1.3 billion in lost U.S. sales annually.7 The high profit potential and
the ease by which copyright piracy is accomplished combine to make
such piracy the worst widespread intellectual property violation in the
world.8 Certain industries are particularly prone to copyright piracy because: (1) the technology required to produce infringing copies is readily

available and inexpensive; (2) consumers of pirated works are indifferent
to, or unaware of, the differences in quality; and (3) innovation is much

more costly than copying. 9 Thus, industries where copyrights are most
important-such as computer software, entertainment, character licens-

ing for fashion and miscellaneous consumer goods, publishing, audio,
and. video-suffer proportionally greater losses. l
As discussed in Part I below, international intellectual property
agreements and U.S. border controls are generally incapable of providing
or enforcing adequate copyright protection. A growing recognition of
the adyerse impact of inadequate foreign intellectual property protection
6. Eighty-nine percent of the respondents believed that losses would "grow greatly,"
"grow moderately," "grow slightly," or "stay more or less constant." Id. at 5-3, Table 5-2.
7. See China, Saudi Arabia Lead List of 12 Biggest Copyright Pirates, According to IIPA
Report, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 510 (Apr. 26, 1989) (discussing INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, TRADE LOSSES DUE TO PIRACY AND OTHER MARKET ACCESS BARRIERS AFFECTING THE U.S. COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES (1989) [hereinafter IIPA

REPORT]). The twelve nations are th6 People's Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, South Korea,
India, the Philippines, Taiwan, Brazil, Egypt, Thailand, Nigeria, and Malaysia. Id. IIPA

members include the Computer Software and Services Industry Association, the Computer
and Business Equipment Manufacturers Association, the Motion Picture Association of
America, the Recording Industry Association of America, the Association of American Publishers, and the National Music Publishers Association. Id. at 511. Recently, the Business

Software Association, comprised of six of the largest U.S. personal computer software publishers, joined IIPA. Also in theNews, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 916 (July 12, 1989).
8. ITC REPORT, supra note 2, at 2-1. The primary causes of inadequate copyright protection are: (1)failure to protect new technology, such as satellite transmissions; (2) failure to
grant certain exclusive rights, such as the right to publicly display works and transmit them
electronically; (3) inadequate terms of protection; (4) formalities that inhibit the effective exercise and enforcement of copyright laws; and (5) insufficient penalties and remedies. Note, A
Trade-BasedResponse to IntellectualPropertyPiracy: A Comprehensive Plan to Aid the Motion
Picture Industry, 76 GEO. L.J. 417, 425 (1987).
9. An industry is vulnerable to infringement whenever: (1) production costs abroad are
relatively lower than in the country where the goods are legitimately manufactured; (2) consumers are slower to discover the quality of the goods purchased; and (3) it becomes more
costly to- produce higher quality noninfringing goods. ITC REPORT, supra note 2, at 4-7.
10. Id. at 2-1. For example, the entertainment industry reported, that piracy losses
amounted to 14.3% of worldwide sales, the computer industry stated a 7.4% loss, whereas the
industrial and extrictive firms reported only a 0.4% loss. Id. at 4-10.
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upon U.S. trade competitiveness has recently focused attention on U.S.
trade laws as alternative relief. The rationale behind use of the trade
laws is as follows: The incentive for research and development, manufacturing, and marketing expenses is effective intellectual property protection. Such protection not only provides the necessary returns on
investment, but also increases the market access and expansion capabilities of U.S. firms in foreign nations. Therefore, any acts by a foreign
government that deny adequate intellectual property protection hamper
the free flow of trade and thus constitute unfair trade practices, forwhich
certain extraordinary remedies are available."'
The primary U.S. trade-based remedies available to combat foreign
copyright infringement' 2 are section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which
allows retaliation against foreign nations that fail to provide adequate
and effective protection to U.S. intellectual property rights, and section
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which provides an in rem remedy against
infringing imports. These sections were extensively amended by the Om-

nibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (the "1988 Trade Act").13
11. This belief is apparent in the premises underlying the.April 1986 Administration
Statement on the Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property Rights Abroad:
(1) all countries' economic growth and international competitiveness can be enhanced by strong domestic intellectual property protection; and,
(2) if countries do not provide strong protection of intellectual property rights, and
an effective system of international enforcement does not exist, then substantial distortions in international trade will result.
reprinted in Intellectual Property Rights: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade of the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1986) [hereinafter Intellectual Property
Rights] (statement of Dr. Harvey Bale, Jr., Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Trade
Policy and Analysis).
The Administration thus believes that inadequate protection and ineffective enforcement
of intellectual property rights constitute unfair trade practices that must be eliminated. See
generally Mossinghoff, The Importance of Intellectual Property Protection in International
Trade, 7 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 235 (1984), for a discussion of the economic effects of
intellectual property protection on international trade and the growth and expansion of U.S.
businesses.
12. While both § 301 and § 337 may be used to address a variety of unfair trade practices,
this Note focuses specifically on copyright actions. See infra notes 33 and 186 and accompanying text for a listing of unfair acts within the purview of § 301 and § 337, respectively.
13. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1157 (codified as amended in scattered statutes of 19
U.S.C.) [hereinafter 1988 Trade Act]. As §§ 301 and 337 will be discussed both prior to and
following the 1988 Trade Act, for convenience, the following references will be used:
1) Section 301 prior to the 1988 Trade Act - 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-16 (1986). [hereinafter
19 U.S.C. § 2411];
2) Section 301 following the 1988 Trade Act - 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-20 as amended by
Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1157 (1988)[hereinafter 1988 Amendments § 2411];
3) Section 337 prior to the 1988 Trade Act - 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1986) [hereinafter 19
U.S.C. § 1337]; and
4) Section 337 following the 1988 Trade Act - 19 U.S.C. § 1337 as amended by Pub. L.
No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1157 (1988) [hereinafter -1988 Amendments § 1337].
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Sections 337 and 301 are commonly interpreted as remedies for specific unfair trade practices; separate proceedings that operate independently of the other and which may be institutedfollowing injury to a U.S.
business or industry as a curative measure. This Note suggests, however,
that the goal of reducing revenue losses from inadequate intellectual
property protection, and particularly those due to copyright infringement, is better met by viewing sections 301 and 337 as preventative measures that function far more effectively when used together in a "losspreventative" synthesis than as separate remedies. This synthesis highlights the advantages of each trade law: the swiftness and effectiveness of
section 337 actions and the long-term goal of establishing equitable market access through the use of section 301's formal and informal
proceedings.
The focus on "prevention" is particularly appropriate for industries
relying on foreign copyright protection, because of the generally short
commercial lives of the associated products and the future losses caused
by damage to goodwill from inferior-quality infringing copies. This Note
thus suggests that a copyright-dependent business incorporate the proposed loss-preventative synthesis as part of its development strategy by:
(1) participating in the establishment of international intellectual property rights and enforcement mechanisms through membership in industry organizations that are committed to increased intellectual property
rights and expanded market access, and are actively involved in lobbying,
treaty negotiations, and consultations; (2) considering the institution of
section 301 formal or informal proceedings against specific nations that
condone infringement of the company's or industry's products within its
borders; and (3) once aware of the presence of infringing imports in the
United States, minimizing injury by swiftly proceeding under section
337, possibly in conjunction with section 301 formal or informal procedures, depending upon the particular nation and practice involved. Used
efficiently, this synthesis will be much more cost-effective than repeatedly
absorbing continual revenue losses, district or foreign court litigation
costs, and the occasional heavy lobbying expenditures for particular protectionist legislation.
The proposed synthesis has the added important benefit of minimizing any conflicts with international trade treaty obligations-the most
significant treaty being the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). 4 Although some, including this author, believe that the
GATT will be a less significant factor in world trade in the future, it is
14. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), concluded in 1947, is an international agreement dealing with tariffs, quotas and other governmental measures used to influence or control foreign trade. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for
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currently the primary treaty governing trade issues. The specific ele-

ments of sections 337 and 301 that may violate GATT principles will be
examined in Parts IID and HID, respectively. At this point, however, a
brief explanation of the importance of GATT-consistent trade statutes
may be helpful.
By authorizing procedures and remedies to combat foreign intellectual property infringement beyond those available against domestic infringers, the United States runs the risk of violating certain GATT
principles, in particular, the national treatment obligation.' 5 A violation
of GATT obligations has several far-reaching effects. First, although the
primary sanction for violations is the normative pressure of the ruling
16
itself, the GATT also permits retaliation by an injured government.

Second, the current Uruguay Round negotiations on the GATT contain,
for the first time, proposals for intellectual property protection. Any action by the United States that is inconsistent with GATT principles may
give a ready-made excuse to those countries attempting to forestall the
proposals. 7 Finally, GATT violations destroy U.S. credibility in all international negotiations. This will produce a continued absence of specific intellectual property protection in treaties other than the GATT.
Moreover, the United States might be unable to garner international allies when attempting to force an unresponsive foreign nation either to
signature October 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (as amended)
[hereinafter the GA T71.
15. The GATT has an adjudicatory procedure under which complaints of violation can be
litigated, resulting in formal legal rulings by the organization. Id. at arts. XII, XIII. The
GATT imposes upon its members, inter alia, the "national treatment" obligation contained in
Article III: upon entering the internal commerce of a member country, goods produced by
foreign signatories must be treated no less favorably than goods produced by the country's own
nationals. Id. Thus, U.S. law must treat domestic and foreign products equally unless differential treatment is justified under one of the GATT express exceptions. Article XX(d) allows
such treatment if certain conditions, causing adverse effects on trade, are met; it does not constitute express protection for intellectual property rights. Id. The conditions allowing differential treatment are as follows:
1) The measure must not be applied in "a manner which would constitute a means
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail;"
'2) It must not be applied in a manner which would constitute "a disguised restriction on international trade;" and
3) It must be "necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not
[otherwise] inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement."
Intellectual Property and Trade: Hearingsbefore the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and
the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 188
(1986) [hereinafter Intellectual Property and Trade] (statement of Professor Robert Hudec,
Univ. of Minn. School of Law).
16. GATT supra note 14, at art. XXIII.
17. See generally Intellectual Property and Trade, supra note 15.
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cease its unfair trade practices or to enact intellectual property
legislation..
In order to demonstrate the importance of utilizing both sections
301 and 337, this Note first illustrates typical problems faced by copyright-dependent industries by describing a hypothetical computer company with foreign sales. The next two parts examine the effectiveness of
sections 301 and 337 in protecting registered U.S. copyrights from foreign copyright infringement both prior to and following passage of the
1988 Trade Act. Each discussion focuses on the elements a practitioner
should investigate prior to instituting an action, such as the procedure
involved in bringing an action; the requirements for finding a violation;
the remedies available; and successful copyright actions under the particular section. GATT considerations are also discussed as they bear significantly upon the continued viability of sections 301 and 337. The
accompanying analyses demonstrate that sections 337 and 301 are effective, but underutilized, means to establish equitable and adequate foreign
copyright protection for U.S. businesses when foreign concerns or governments engage in actions adverse to U.S. interests. Thus, the final part
concludes that those companies contemplating or engaged in international sales of copyrighted products should consider incorporating the
proposed section 301/337 synthesis as part of their development strategy,
thus focusing their efforts on. the long-term prevention of intellectual
property-related revenue losses.

I
Illustrating the Problem
Consider, for example, certain common difficulties faced by a hypothetical computer software firm that has developed a commercially successful spreadsheet program registered under the U.S. Copyright Act as a
computer program. Worldwide distribution of the program has resulted
in the manufacture of low-cost, lower-quality infringing copies in a newly
industrialized nation whose copyright laws do not protect computer programs. The firm is not only losing potential sales revenues and royalty
payments from businesses within that nation, but potential revenue in
other countries where the infringing software may be sold as if it were
legitimate. Additionally, the firm's future market share in both the particular nation and the other countries may be supplanted by the infringers."5 Finally, if the firm's reputation is suffering as a result of lower18. Along with losses due to inadequate intellectual property protection, the firm will lose
potential market share and revenue if trade barriers to market access exist. For example, the
IIPA REPORT noted attempts by the South Korean motion picture industry to prevent market
access to U.S. motion pictures, including "vandalizing movie houses and planting live snakes
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quality copies, its current and future revenue from other products may be
jeopardized. The firm has attempted to enforce its rights under the
Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention, but has dis19
covered that an effective enforcement mechanism is lacking.
The firm has been informed by its U.S. distributors that the infringing program is being imported by unauthorized distributors and is affecting the firm's revenue and reputation. To battle the infringing imports,
the firm has notified the Customs Service, which is attempting to halt the
importations at the border.2" Unfortunately, a significant number of imports are slipping past Customs and, once the goods are in the stream of
commerce, the Customs Service lacks jurisdiction to circumscribe this
conduct.2 1 While litigation of the issue in federal court may result in a
in theatres showing American films." IIPA REPORT, supra note 7, at 510. Although not
specifically discussed in this Note, the discussion of § 301 in Part II is applicable to trade
barriers other than inadequate copyright protection.
19. Universal Copyright Convention, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No. 7868,
943 U.N.T.S. 180, as amended (entered into force July 10, 1974). The United States has been a
party to the Universal Copyright Convention (U.C.C.) since 1955. Recently, the United States
amended the Copyright Act to comport with the standards enunciated in the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, thus qualifying it for membership. See
New Bush Administration and CongressLikely to Make Trade A High PriorityAgain in 1989, 6
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 113, 131 (Jan. 25, 1989). Both the Berne Convention and the U.C.C.
are based on the concept of national treatment, requiring member nations to accord foreign
works the same protection as it grants to domestic works and to prescribe minimum standards
of copyright protection. See generally U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 1986: Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Patents,Copyrights and Trademarksof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1986). The Berne Convention offers more comprehensive
and specific protection than the U.C.C., but both conventions lack an effective enforcement
mechanism. See id. Additionally, a country will not join either convention if granting effective
and adequate copyright protection is not in its best interest. For these reasons, the conventions
may be unable to deter.the worst offenders from continuing their practices.
20. Section .602 of the Copyright Act prohibits the importation of copies into the United
States without the authority of the copyright owner. 17 U.S.C. § 602 (1982). Prior to enforcement, the Customs Service may require either a court order enjoining importation or proof of a
valid copyright that is being infringed. Id. at § 603(b). Articles imported in violation of the
Copyright Act may be subject to seizure and forfeiture. Id. at § 603(c). Forfeited articles will
be destroyed unless the importer can demonstrate that he had no reasonable grounds for believing that his acts violated the law. Id. These provisions are promulgated in the U.S. Customs Service Regulations, which contain rules for the recordation and enforcement of U.S.
registered copyrights. See 19 C.F.R. §§ 133.31-133.53 (1988).
21. In many cases, copyright owners have discovered that the Customs Service cannot
adequately enforce their copyrights. Customs lacks "sufficient means for monitoring, analyzing, and disseminating information about fraudulent activities. Consequently, whatever success [Customs has] in detecting and investigating fraud in one area of the country [is] often not
known in another." Unfair Foreign Trade Practices (Part4): Hearingsbefore the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 11 (1984) [hereinafter Unfair Foreign Trade Practices] (testimony of William von Raab,
Comm'r, U.S. Customs Serv., Dep't of the Treasury). This has led to "port shopping" by
importers who look for inconsistencies in classifying and appraising merchandise and in uncovering evidence of fraud. Id. Second, once the articles have passed through Customs, the
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restraining order and damages, in personam jurisdiction over the infringers may not be available. Moreover, the litigation could take years and
computer programs typically have short commercial lives.2 2

II
Section 301
First established in the Trade Act of 1974, section 301 was formulated in response to the developing tendency of foreign governments to
create a trade surplus by limiting imports through tariff and non-tariff
barriers.2 3 Prior to the 1988 Trade Act, section 301 authorized the President to take all "appropriate and feasible action ' 2 4 to enforce U.S. rights
under trade agreements or to respond to any act, policy, or practice of a
foreign government that is inconsistent with the provisions of any trade
agreement, or that is unreasonable,2" unjustifiable,2 6 or discriminatory2 7
and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce.2" Such action may include
modifying or denying benefits of trade agreement concessions or imposing duties or quotas on the products of the foreign country, and may be
exercised either nondiscriminatorily or solely against the foreign country
or goods involved.2 9 The statute acknowledges GATT obligations; if a
Customs Service no longer has jurisdiction and therefore cannot prevent the sale of the infringing imports within the United States See generally Unfair Foreign Trade Practices,supra.
22. A new study surveying 164 major American, European, and Canadian firms, found
that two-thirds of the surveyed companies are currently involved in litigation and are taking
other action (e.g., non-compete or non-disclosure convenants with employees) to protect themselves against the worldwide theft and counterfeiting of intellectual property. Also in the News,
6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 643 (May 17, 1989). However, "many companies do not believe
that litigation is the answer to their problems because of time and money constraints." Id.
23. Fisher & Steinhardt, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974."Protectionfor U.S.Exporters of Goods, Services, and Capital, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 569, 571-72 (1982).
24. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (1989).
25. "Unreasonable" means any act, policy, or practice which is deemed unfair and inequitable although it may not necessarily violate the international legal rights of the United States.
The term includes unfair acts that deny market access, establishment of businesses, or "adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights." Id. at § 241 l(d)(3)(B)(i)(II).
Note that this is not a dictionary definition of "unreasonable", i.e., the policy has no rational
relation to the end sought to be achieved, but rather is defined normatively in terms of bad
faith, lack of equity, or lack of fair dealing. See Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 23, at 598.
26. "Unjustifiable" refers to any act, policy, or practice which is in violation of, or inconsistent with, international obligations. The term includes the unfair acts listed as "unreasonable." 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (d)(4).
27. "Discriminatory" is defined as any act, policy, or practice which denies national or
most favored nation treatment to U.S. goods, services, or investments. Id. at § 241 l(d)(5).
28. "Commerce" includes services associated with international trade and foreign direct
investment by U.S. persons with implications for trade in goods and services. Id. at
§ 241 l(d)(1).
29. Id. at § 2411 (a)(2), (b).
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trade agreement 30 is involved and the matter is not .resolved within the
consultation period specified in the agreement, the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) is required to initiate formal dispute settlement
procedures as provided in the agreement.3 1
Section 301 is not a substitute for statutes addressing specific unfair
trade practices, such as section 337. Rather, it is the only trade law tool
available to private parties seeking to force negotiations on the lowering
of non-tariff barriers against U.S. exports. Section 301 has been used
primarily to seek expanded access to markets that are restricted due to
foreign governmental action3 2 and thus is available to attack the intellectual property acts or policies of foreign nations that lead to condoned
infringement of U.S. intellectual property rights.3 3
Prior to the 1988 Trade Act, section 301 was essentially an expansion of the long-vested presidential authority to retaliate against discriminatory foreign trade policies that unduly burden U.S. commerce, giving
the Executive the diplomatic and economic tools necessary to achieve a
more equitable world trading system.34 This discretionary authority was
often used to induce other countries to eliminate unfair trade practices. 35
Historically, however, the President has considered retaliation a tool of
very last resort: "[t]he U.S. Government ...[has gone] to great lengths
to avoid taking action against the foreign country, instead preferring to
exert the maximum pressure to get some movement towards a reduction
in the complained of act, practice, or policy." 36 Dissatisfaction with this
30. The United States Trade Representative (USTR) has consistently interpreted "trade
agreement" narrowly as either the GATT or a trade agreement approved under the the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 2503(a) (1986). This limited construction allows the
USTR to avoid the mandatory formal dispute settlement agreements, such as World Court
procedures, required by some non-GATT agreements. Bello & Holmer, U.S. Trade Law and
Policy, Series #10: Significant Recent Developments in Section 301 Unfair Trade Cases, 21
INT'L LAW. 211, 212 (1987).
31. 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a).
32. Borrus & Goldstein, supra note 1, at 347; Coffield, Using Section 301 of the Trade Act
of 1974 as a Response to Foreign Government Trade Actions: When, Why, and How, 6 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 381 (1981).
33. While the ITC REPORT, supra note 2, was concerned only with losses due to piracy,
there are other trade barriers which cause significant damage to the U.S. copyright industry by
restricting trade and creating an environment in which piracy flourishes. These barriers include quotas, high duties, discriminatory taxes, domestic ownership requirements, currency
controls, and forced subsidies of local industry. Piracy of U.S. Copyrighted Works in Ten Selected Countries, reprintedin Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 11, at 145, 149. Where
these trade barriers are particularly oppressive, even improved intellectual property protection
may not lessen losses as U.S. companies have little incentive to enforce their rights in these
countries. Id. Although this Note focuses specifically on copyright actions under § 301, the
discussion also applies to attacking these other trade barriers.
34. Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 23, at 573.
35. Coffield, supra note 32, at 382.
36. Id. at 399.
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gentle policy was clearly expressed in the 1988 Trade Act wherein the
President's discretionary authority was delegated to the USTR and retaliation mandated in certain circumstances.3 7
Section 301 may be used to attack the two major deficiencies in intellectual property rights protection that lead to the trade distortionabsent, inadequate, and non-uniform foreign intellectual property laws,
and inefficient enforcement of the existing laws. As will be discussed further below, section 301 investigations may proceed either "formally" or
"informally." As of December 1989, seventy-eight formal section 301
investigations had been initiated, with only two filings alleging decreased
market access due to inadequate protection of intellectual property
rights, which included copyrights. 3" In both actions, the foreign governments amended their copyright laws in order to prevent retaliation.
As will be discussed further, informal investigations involve consultations with the offending government and may thus achieve the same
purpose as formal procedures without some of the international political
repercussions. This Note suggests that the informal procedures are generally preferable, particularly in light of the 1988 Trade Act amendments, as both a short-term cure for, and a long-term preventative of,
infringement. Thus, rather than viewing section 301 merely as the final.
step in securing access for U.S. goods to foreign markets, U.S. businesses
and lobbies should consider utilizing section 301 as a tool for establishing
equitable intellectual property rights in nations whose inadequate or ineffective intellectual property laws have resulted in U.S. trade losses in that
nation or in other countries.
A.

Procedure

Section 301 is administered by the Office of the USTR.3 9 Investigations may be initiated in response to a petition filed by an interested per37. See infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.

38.

See UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE SECTION 301 TABLE OF CASES

(De-

cember 1989) [hereinafter SECTION 301 TABLE OF CASES] (available at the Office of the General Counsel, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Washington, D.C.). The two
copyright actions were Brazil Informatics (Inv. No. 301-49) and Korean Intellectual Property
Rights (Inv. No. 301-52). Intellectual property petitions not alleging copyright violations are
Korea Steel Wire Rope Subsidies and Trademark Infringement (Inv. No. 301-39), Brazil
Pharmaceuticals (Inv. No. 301-61), and Argentina Pharmaceuticals (Inv. No. 301-68). The
Argentina Pharmaceuticals petition was withdrawn on September 25, 1989, because of Argentina's progress in bilateral consultations. PharmaceuticalManufacturers Association Withdraws 301 Petition Against Argentina, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1226 (Sept. 27, 1989). In
addition, a petition was recently filed by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's Association, who
is also the complainant in the Brazil and Argentina Pharmaceutical matters, regarding Chile's
lack of process patent protection for pharmaceuticals.
39. The USTR is appointed by the President and has primary responsibility for developing and coordinating the implementation of U.S. international trade policy, including trade
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son 40 or by a motion of the USTR. 4 1 The Section 301 Committee reviews
petitions and develops recommendations to be submitted to the USTR.4 2
The USTR has forty-five days following receipt of the petition in which
to determine whether to initiate an investigation. 43 If the petition is rejected, the decision must be published in the Federal Register." If the
petition is accepted, the USTR must publish a summary of the opinion in
the Federal Register and provide an opportunity for the presentation of
public views. 45 If the petition includes a request for a hearing, the hearnegotiations. The USTR coordinates interagency resources by identifying and referring foreign unfair trade practices to the appropriate federal agency or department. Additionally, the
USTR serves as the principal advisor to, and spokesperson of, the President on all matters
affecting international trade. The USTR is required to report directly to both Congress and
the PresidEnt on trade agreements, barriers to international trade, and the'state of trade negotiations. 19 U.SC. § 2171 (1986).
40. Inter alia, the petition must identify: (1) the petitioner and the interest affected by the
unfair trade practice; (2) the U.S. rights being denied, referring to the particular part of § 301
involved; and (3) the foreign country and product or service involved. The petitioner must
include specific information regarding the volume of trade involved and the impact on the
petitioner and U.S. commerce. 15 C.F.R. § 2006.1 (1988).
The 1988 Amendments define "interested persons" as including domestic firms and workers, consumer interest representatives, U.S. exporters, and any industrial user of goods that
may be affected by § 301 determinations. 1988 Amendments § 241 l(d)(9), supra note 13.
41. The President is also authorized to take action even if no petition has been filed, in
which case he must provide an opportunity for a public hearing on the matter, unless "expeditious action" is required. Id. at § 241 1(d)(1). In such cases, the President will request that the
USTR initiate an investigation in order to advise the President. Id. at § 2412(c). Only four
investigations have been self-initiated and those occurred between September and November
1985. See SECTION 301 TABLE OF CASES, supra note 38.
42. The interagency process under which § 301 cases are handled is not clearly stated in
the statute or the governing regulations. At the top is the Cabinet-level Trade Policy Committee; at the other end, at the working level, is the Section 301 Committee. See Coffield, supra
note 32, at 396-97. The Section 301 Committee is chaired by a USTR bfficial and composed of
officials from other interested agencies including the Departments of State, Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, Justice, Treasury, Interior, Transportation, Defense, and Energy, as well as the
Council of Economic Advisers, the Office of Management and Budget, and the National Security Council. Id. Also, depending upon the significance of the matter, White House officials
from different levels may be involved. Id. The Committee arrives at its decisions by consensus; depending on the particular issue, some agencies having more influence or interest than
others. Id. A matter will be elevated within the trade policy structure if a major agency
disagrees with the Committee's rcommendation, or if a large volume of trade, or particularly
sensitive political or economic issues, e.g., cases involving the European Community or Japan,
is involved. Id. at 397. The Committee forwards its recommendations to the USTR who
decides whether or not to accept them.
The Section 301 Committee essentially represents the petitioner in the later bilateral and
multilateral negotiations; as such, it is always advisable to consult the Section 301 Committee
informally before filing a petition.
43. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(2) (1989).
44. Id. at § 2412(b).
45. Id.
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ing must be held within thirty days following acceptance of the
petition.46
On the date that an investigation begins, the USTR is required to
request consultations with the foreign country concerned.4 7 If the matter
involves a trade agreement, and a mutually acceptable resolution is not
reached during the consultation period specified in the agreement, the
USTR must request formal dispute settlement procedures.4 8 During the
consultation and dispute settlement proceedings, the USTR is required to
seek advice and information from the petitioner and certain other appropriate representatives.4 9
If the investigation involves certain matters that are covered by a
trade agreement, as well as issues that are not, in practice the USTR
must decide whether to bifurcate the investigation and pursue dispute
settlement procedures on the appropriate matters, or whether to consolidate the investigation and request dispute settlement procedures on all
issues.5° This decision may be crucial to the outcome because if a GATT
dispute settlement panel finds the section 301-violative practice to be acceptable under the GATT, the practice will be legitimized. Any retaliatory action by the United States will then violate the nondiscrimination
principle of the GATT. Given that the GATT does not protect intellectual property, it is entirely possible that an illegal practice under U.S. law
would not be found to violate GATT principles. For this reason, bilateral resolution of intellectual property issues may be in the United States'
best interests, despite the persuasive force of a GATT ruling.5 '
After investigation, consultations, and formal dispute settlement
proceedings, if applicable, the USTR must recommend to the President
the action to be taken within deadlines dependent upon the subject matter.52 The 1988 Trade Act reformulated the deadlines, enacting a specific
46. Id. at § 2413(a). Other timely requests for hearings may be granted, but there is no

time limit in which the USTR must hold the hearings. 15 C.F.R. § 2006.7.
47. 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a).
48. Id.

49. These include private and non-federal government sectors with interests in the negotiation and operation of trade agreements. Id.; 19 U.S.C. § 2155 (1986). The USTR may also
seek the views of the ITC on the probable economic impact of the proposed action. 15 C.F.R.
§ 2006.11.
50. Bello & Holmer, supra note 30, at 213 n.13.
51. For example, Brazil Informatics involved both GATT issues (e.g., tariff and quota
questions) and non-GATT issues (e.g., enforcement of intellectual property rights). The
USTR proceeded bilaterally on all issues, resulting in new intellectual property protection laws

in Brazil.
52. The USTR must make the recommendation not later than: 1) 7 months following
initiation of the investigation if the petition alleges only an export subsidy covered by the
GATT Subsidies Agreement; (2) 8 months if the petition alleges any other matter covered by

the Subsidies Agreement; (3) 30 days following conclusion of dispute settlement procedures if
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time limit for intellectual property cases of six months (nine months for
complex cases) from the date the investigation was instituted.5 3 Time
limits on other actions were also shortened.54
Within twenty-one days after receipt of a recommendation, the President must determine what action, if any, to take." The determination
and the reasons therefor must be published in the Federal Register. 6
The 1988 Trade Act transferred the authority to make determinations and take action from the President to the USTR.57 Moreover, retaliation under section 301 is divided into actions mandated against
unjustifiable foreign practices, i.e., those which violate the international
legal rights of the U.S., and discretionary actions against unreasonable 8
or discriminatory foreign practices.5 9 If a matter is designated as
mandatory, the USTR must generally' take some action within the
scope of its authority, subject to the specific direction of the President. 6 '
With respect to discretionary matters, the USTR is authorized to take all
"appropriate and feasible action" within the scope of its authority and
subject to the President's specific direction. 62 The USTR's discretion in
petition involves any other trade agreement; or (4) 12 months after initiation in all other cases.
19 U.S.C. § 2414(a).
53. The time limit will be extended if: (1) the matter involves complex issues requiring
additional time; (2) the foreign country involved is making substantial progress in drafting and
implementing measures to provide adequate and effective intellectual property protection; or
(3) the country is undertaking enforcement measures to provide adequate and effective protection. 1988 Amendments § 2414(a)(3), supra note 13.
54. The other deadlines are: (1) the earlier of either 30 days following the conclusion of
the dispute settlement procedure or 18 months following the institution of the investigation, if
the matter involves a trade agreement other than the GATT Subsidies Agreement; or (2) 12
months following the initiation of the investigation for all other matters. If a matter is not
concluded within the minimum dispute settlement period, as provided for in the trade agreement, the USTR must so notify Congress within 15 days. Id. at § 2414(2), (4).
55. 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(d)(2).
56. Id.
57. See 1988 Amendments § 2411, supra note 13.
58. In determining whether or not a practice is "unreasonable," the USTR must take
account of several factors: (1) any actions that the country has taken that "demonstrate a
significant and tangible overall advancement" in getting rid of the practice; (2) whether the
practice is inconsistent with the level of economic development of the foreign country; and (3)
reciprocal opportunities for foreign nationals and firms in the United States. Id. at
§ 241 l(d)(3)(C).
59. Id. at § 241 1(a).
60. The USTR does not have to take action if: (1) the United States receives an unfavorable determination or ruling under the GATT or other trade agreement settlement procedures;
or (2) the USTR finds that the foreign country is taking satisfactory measures to alleviate or
eliminate the practice or, where such action is impossible, to compensate the United States; or
(3) when, in "extraordinary cases," the taking of the action would cause the U.S. adverse
economic or national security harm. Id. at § 241 l(a)(2).
61. The President may also direct the USTR to take other actions that are within the
scope of the presidential powers. Id. at § 241 l(a)(1).
62. Id. at § 241 1(b).
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actions requiring, mandatory retaliation is limited to the measures listed
in the statute,6 3 unlike the full discretion accorded to the President prior
to the 1988 Amendments.
Prior to the 1988 Trade Act, section 301 did not contain any provisions regarding modification or termination of an action. Currently, an
action automatically terminates after four years unless the petitioner or a
representative of a benefiting industry submits a written request for continuation during the sixty days preceeding the termination date.' However, the USTR is required to report to Congress on any modifications or
terminations of any section 301 actions and the reasons therefor. 65 'Additionally, the USTR is required to monitor foreign compliance with agreements and measures undertaken to enforce the rights of the United States
under a trade agreement.6 6
The most significant change to section 301 is contained in the requirement that the USTR report annually on U.S. trade liberalization
priorities-and designate "priority foreign countries." The USTR is required to identify as trade liberalization priorities, the acts or practices of
foreign nations that constitute significant barriers to, or distortions of,
U.S. exports or foreign direct investment and to estimate the impact of
the trade-distorting practice on U.S. commerce. 67 The USTR must further identify which of those nations are priority foreign countries, based
on the pervasiveness and impact of the trade-distorting practices. 68 During the following twenty-one days, the USTR must initiate section 301
actions against each identified priority country.69 Understandably, the
breadth of this provision has caused section 301 actions instituted against
priority countries to be renamed Super 301 actions.
63. These include suspension or withdrawal of trade agreement concessions; imposition of
duties, quotas, and fees on services; and entry into binding agreements with the nation, committing it to eliminating the offending practice or burden on U.S. commerce, or to provide
compensatory benefits to the U.S. economic sector harmed by the practice. Id. at § 2411 (c).
64. Id. at § 2417(c). If so requested, the USTR must conduct a review of the effectiveness
of the action and its effect on the U.S. economy, as well as any possible alternatives. Id. at
§ 2417(a)(2).
65. Id. at § 2417(b).
66. Id. at § 2416(a). If compliance is not satisfactory, the USTR is directed to consult
with the petitioner and provide a public hearing before taking further action. Id. at § 2416(c).
67. Id. at § 2420(a)(1). The report must include: (1) trade barriers and trade distorting
practices whose elimination has been identified as having the most significant potential to increase U.S. exports; (2) "priority" foreign countries that have trade agreements with the
United States, the full implementation of which would increase U.S. exports; and (3) the
USTR's estimate of the total amount by which exports to each such country would have increased in the previous year if the trade distortions did not exist. Id. at § 2420.
68. Id. at § 2420(a).
69. Id. at § 2420(b).
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The USTR is' required to undertake a similar process of identifying
and investigating those nations that deny adequate intellectual property
protection or fair market access to U.S. persons relying on such protection, as well as which of these nations are designated as "priority foreign
countries" under a 1988 Trade Act measure known as the Special 301
provision.7 ° Within thirty days following designation of priority countries, the USTR must initiate section 301 actions against each identified
priority country and investigations must be 'concluded within 'six
months.7" Possibly because Special 301 actions run the risk of being even
less GATT-consistent than other section 301 actions, the USTR did not
target any priority countries on the specified -deadline of May 25, 1989,
but instead created a two-tier "watch list" that required the named countries to make progress on intellectual property reform or to risk designa72
tion as a priority country.
Whether attempting to halt current practices through the use of section 301's retaliatory authority, or employing a preventative approach,
certain steps should always be taken by an interested party or petitioner.
First, the interested party should request information from the USTR as
to the' nature and extent of the specific trade policy or practice of the
foreign nation, U.S. rights and associated remedies under any trade
agreement with that nation or under U.S law, and the availability of U.S.
and international proceedings with respect to the specific offensive prac70. Id. at § 2412(b)(2) requires the USTR to initiate an investigation into the act, policy,
or practice of a foreign nation that caused it to be identified under. § 2242(a) (i.e., Identification
of countries that deny adequate protection, or market access, for intellectual property rights).
Priority foreign countries are defined as those nations with the most onerous or egregious acts
and practices that cause the greatest actual or potential adverse impact, and that are not entering into good faith negotiations or making significant progress in current negotiations to provide adequate and effective intellectual property protection. Id. at § 2242(b)L Such designation
is proper only if the USTR finds that "there is a factual basis for the denial of fair and equitable market access as a result of the violation of international law or agreement or the existence
of barriers ....
Id.
71. Id. at § 2420(b). The USTR has substantial discretion with respect to self-initiation.
Id. at § 2412(c). First, the countries must be identified: (1) that have the most egregious practices that deny adequate protection of intellectual property rights, or deny fair and equitable
market access to U.S. persons relying on such rights; (2) whose practices have the greatest
adverse impact on the relevant U.S. products; and (3) that are not already involved or entering
into good faith negotiations. Additionally, if initiation of an investigation would be deterimental to U.S. interests, the USTR is exempted from the self-initation requirement, although
the USTR would have to report to Congress on the reasons for the determination and the
economic interests that would be harmed. Id. at § 2412(b)(1)(A)-(C).
During the required consultation period, the USTR must attempt to negotiate an agreement which provides for the elimination of, or compensation for, the offending practices. Id
at § 2420(c)(1)(A). The practices should be eliminated and incremental increases in U.S.
exports to that country should occur within three years. Id. at § 2420(c)(1)(B).
72. See infra notes 118-131 and accompanying text for a discussion of the watch list and

Super 301 actions.
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tice or practices.7" Requesting this information serves several purposes.
It helps to identify and gather evidence regarding the unfair practice,
thus producing a more credible petition.74 Second, particularly with respect to intellectual property petitions that do not charge an express violation of a trade agreement, it may be advisable to obtain government
assistance in drafting a petition which must allege restricted U.S. export
access to foreign markets. Third, and most importantly, the request may
serve to alert the USTR and the foreign government of a potential section
301 action, allowing the possibility of a solution through informal private
discussions.7 5 In this regard, it would be useful to advise the USTR of
current or previous section 337 actions against the citizens of a particular
nation in order to illustrate that government's nonresponsiveness to, or
ignorance of, intellectual property violations.
An interested party should know precisely what relief is sought and
identify it clearly in the petition. 76 One should attempt to present a realistic, final "solution" by describing in economic terms what the action
will accomplish.
Finally, an interested party should keep in contact with the members of the Section 301 Committee and the members of the appropriate
federal agencies and congressional committees. 77 The Section 301 Committee arrives at its decision by consensus; thus, constant sensitivity to
changing political situations is necessary. Such contact will also serve to
keep the petitioner more closely involved in the later stages of trade negotiations and/or section 301 negotiation procedures.
73. The USTR is required to make this information available upon request. 1988 Amendments § 2418(a), supra note 13.
74. See Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 23, at 606.

75. Coffield, supra note 32, at 389. This tactic works well with governments who appear
intransigent in order to show they are not being "bullied" by the United States. Other nations
may respond to the threat of retaliation, particularly if that government lacks flexibility in
negotiations due to domestic or international political concerns. Id. n.63 (citing Japan as an
example of domestic protectionist feelings requiring threats of retaliatory action by the United
States).
76. The relief requested should not have the potential to adversely affect U.S. industry. It
should be effectively and narrowly targeted to the offending practice; and the petitioner should
seek relief that can be taken solely by the Executive branch, not relief that is more properly
legislative or judicial. Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 23, at 607.
77. Such contact helps demonstrate the seriousness of the matter as well as providing the
Section 301 Committee, Congress, and the appropriate agencies with a ready source of information. Most important, "congressional pressure and pressure from other interest groups will
help greatly in stiffening the spine of U.S. officials who, in the final analysis, are going to be the
ones to decide" the resolution of a particular case or the negotiation of a agreement. Coffield,
supra note 32, at 400.
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B. GATT Considerations
Section 301 actions that are not intellectual property-based generally involve violations of international obligations which are also actionable under the GATT, and therefore section 301 requires compliance with
GATT dispute settlement procedures. The GATT dispute settlement
procedures are as follows:7 8 If a GATT member believes that any benefit
accruing to it under the GATT is being impaired, it is first required to
consult with the government of the offending nation. If consultation
does not lead to resolution, then the contracting parties are required to
promptly investigate and make appropriate findings and recommendations. In practice, this task is delegated to the GATT Council who turns
the complaint over to a panel. The Panel Report is generally sent to the
disputing parties as part of a "fix-it" approach to the problem. If the
problem is not solved according to the recommendations, the full report
is made available and on the record so that the contracting parties may
take appropriate action, including retaliation.
Although intended to promote free trade and the notion of a "level
playing field," section 301 may easily be viewed as protectionist legislation. Additionally, unless the foreign practices are in fact violations of
GATT obligations, the retaliation permitted or mandated under section
301 is itself a GATT violation.
The virtually limitless scope of section 301 and the broad range of retaliation which the President [and, now, the USTR] can impose thereunder may suggest that an aggressive use of section 301 will undermine
an open international economy. Unilateral determinations by the
President as to the meaning of international rules or his broad authority to adjust trade relations may be viewed ... as a notorious end-run
around GATT ....

Currently, this scenario is eliciting embarrassing results for the
United States. Following the imposition of retaliatory measures against
the European Community for its decision to ban the sale of hormone78. Compliance, Disputes and Citizen Complaints, in
99, 107 (1982).

CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF IN-

TERNATIONAL TRADE LAW

79. Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 23, at 689. These authors suggest that § 301 should

be used only in instances of clear violations of international rules, and warn of a clear danger in
the United States
[seeking] to repeal the law of comparative advantage, dilut[ing] GATT by moving
away from the accepted principle of unconditional most favored nation treatment,
and unleash[ing] an aggressive campaign to demand liberalization in other countries
by brandishing threats of retaliation under section 301 when it has unilaterally de-

cided that the current balance of opportunities is 'unfair'.

Id. at 688.
As one commentator put it: "to the extent you regard a Section 301 proceeding as a final
and definitive adjudication, you're really saying that the President of the United States is judge,
jury and hangman for an international rule." Compliance, Disputes, and Citizen Complaints,

supra note 78, at 110.
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enhanced beef, the United States was forced to rebuff a GATT charge
that it resorts to unilateral action to solve trade problems. 8 ° In an answer that may indicate the difficulties surrounding the continued existence of the GATT, the United States responded that it would cease such
retaliation if other countries would do likewise."a In a separate matter,
President Ronald Reagan imposed 100% tariffs on certain Brazilian imports in retaliation for Brazil's alleged failure to provide adequate patent
protection for U.S. pharmaceutical products.82 The United States later
backed down "in the face of overwhelming pressure," and accepted the
establishment of an investigatory panel to rule on whether punitiv'e import duties levied on Brazilian pharmaceutical products violate the
GATT.8" It is clear, therefore, that section 301 retaliation is perceived
by GATT members as unilateral acts in violation of GATT principles.
If the above concerns werejustified prior to the imposition of the
1988 Trade Act amendments, then the broadening of mandatory retaliatory powers and the required institution of Super 301 actions will exacerbate hostility against the United States among the GATT's member
nations.8 4 Super 301 actions may additionally cause resentment abroad
because of (1) the emphasis on sectoral reciprocity, i.e., requiring certain
U.S:-determined foreign industrial sectors to be open to U.S. trade, regardless of whether other sectors in the United States are open, (2) the
determination of what 'is "fair" or "unfair" regardless of whether such
practices are forbidden by international agreement, e.g., unilateralism,
and (3) the possibility of Super 301 being controlled or "captured" by
U.S. export interests.85
80. US. Rebuffs Criticismat Council Meeting that It Acts Unilaterallyon Trade Problems,
6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 194 (Feb. 15, 1989).
81. Id. The United States later agreed to bilateral discussions with the European Community. See U.S. Accepts Creation of GA TT Panelto Study Sanctions on BrazilianPharmaceutical Goods, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 238 (Feb. 22, 1989).
82. United States Isolated as it Resists Call/orProbe of Tariffs on Brazilian Goods, 6 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 23 (Jan. 4, 1989).
83. US. Accepts Creation of GATT Panelto Study Sanctions on BrazilianPharmaceutical
Goods, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 238 (Feb. 22, 1989). More than 50 countries had gathered in
Brazil's comer while no nation supported the U.S. action in imposing 100% duties on pharmaceutical products from Brazil in response to Brazil's lack of pharmaceutical patent protection.
Id.
84. For example, the European Community Commission has designated the entire 1988
Trade Act as "provisions of U.S. trade laws which could be used in a harmful way against the
Community's trading interests" and labeled the Super 301 provision as "potentially dangerous
to the whole relationship." ECReport Cites 42 U.S. Trade Barriers,Super 301 Provision Called
Major Threat, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 575 (May 10, 1989).
85. Speech by Susan W. Liebeler, partner in Irell & Manella, Washington, D.C., and former Chairperson of the ITC, Trade with Pacific Rim Nations: What to Expect in 1989 (Apr.
20, 1989).
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These concerns will undoubtedly play a large role. in Administration
and USTR decisions regarding section 301 actions. Notably, however,
the crucial factor inhibiting GATT consistency appears to be the possibility of unilateral imposition of mandatory retaliation. Thus, if U.S. interests in adequate intellectual property protection are accommodated
under informal section 301 procedures, there should not be any GATTconsistency problems. For this reason, since the long-term feasibility of
section 301 is, in part, dependent upon its consistency with GATT obligations, informal procedures should be used whenever possible. An informal procedure of private negotiations avoids face-saving standoffs and
U.S. threats of "priority" country designation from stalling negotiations.
Note that use of informal section 301 procedures will not bar companies
from using other trade or statutory measures to encourage nations to
accord adequate intellectual protection, such as the Generalized System
of Preferences. 6
C. Advantages of Informal Proceedings
Section 301 provides significant relief against. nontariff trade barriers, particularly if the barrier violates a trade agreement provision or involves a recognized unfair practice. Occasionally the mere filing of a
petition has a sufficiently in terrorem effect so that the foreign country
ceases the offending practice.8 7 More typically, the petitioner can expect
86. The Generalized System of Preferences [hereinafter GSP] provides duty-free protection to eligible products from developing countries (who are often the worst intellectual property rights offenders) designated as beneficiaries. One of the purposes of the GSP is to
encourage developing countries to provide adequate and effective intellectual property protection. This is to be achieved through GATT-consistent methods. The extent to which a country provided such protection is "given great weight" in deciding the extent of its benefits. See
Intellectual Property and Trade - 1987: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1987) (statement of Alice Zalik, Former Assistant General Counsel, U.S.
Trade Representative). Private parties may request review of GSP eligibility of a particular
nation based on its practices relating to intellectual property rights. Unfair Foreign Trade
Practices:Hearings before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1987). (testimony of Michael Smith, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative).
.Recently, however, the USTR rejected an intellectual property-based petition against
awarding GSP benefits to Brazil, on the basis that Brazil had been named under the Special
301 measure, as well as a similar petition against the Philippines. USTR to Reevaluate GSP
Eligibility of Seven Nations Under Review of Duty-Free Program, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
1063 (Aug. 16, 1989).
87. Kennedy, Presidential Authority Under Section 337, Section 301, and the Escape
Clause: The Casefor Less Discretion, 20 CORNELL INT!L L.J. 127, 143 (1987). For example,
the MPEAA, the foreign trade arm of the Motion Picture Association of America, filed a
§ 301 petition in September 1988. The petition alleged that South Korea had failed to live up
to a 1985 agreement with the U.S. film, home yideo, and television industries by employing a
censorship policy aimed at preventing the direct'distribution of MPEAA member films. In
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the investigation to progress to bilateral negotiations. Because retaliation
is considered a last resort, the threat of retaliation is often not taken seriously, with compromise being more common. Thus, from the petitioner's point of view, section 301 has often been a frustrating avenue of
relief, involving an uncertain remedy and long negotiation periods."8
Certainly the 1988 Trade Act has broadened the available remedies
and strengthened the impact of threatened retaliation. However, as
noted above, the spectre of international disapproval and belligerent facesaving standoffs creates a scenario wherein designation of priority countries, or the public threat thereof, would decrease foreign government
intervention against infringers and thus actually increase revenue losses.
For these reasons, the 1988 Trade Act amendments have increased
the possible repercussions of formal filings. The informal procedures are
therefore more significant as an alternative avenue for relief. In many
instances, the goal of reducing both current and future revenue losses
from foreign infringment will be better achieved through the "behind the
scenes" actions of the USTR and the involved industries. Formal complaints should be considered a last resort, particularly now that retaliation may be mandated, because the offending nation will merely refuse to
budge for fear of appearing weak. Moreover, once a formal complaint is
filed, retaliation may be mandated, which will further increase hostilities
as well as probable conflicts with GATT obligations, thus allowing the
offending nation to retaliate. The end result of the increased tension is,
of course, a decrease in U.S. credibility in international trade negotiations as well as hampering any further intellectual property negotiations
between the United States and the particular nation. A formal investigation may thus be a shortsighted response to a long-term problem. In
addition, as a practical matter, the short time limits imposed on bilateral
negotiations by section 301, and particularly the Special 301 provision,
may sabotage any pre-agreement progress that has been made. Thus,
unless section 301 is amended to omit mandatory retaliation, informal
discussions may be the most appropriate way to achieve a reduction in
revenue losses due to infringement.
effect, the restrictions imposed a film quota of between four and six films per year per company, destroying the viability of MPEAA members maintaining distribution offices in South
Korea. Film Industry Files Section 301 Complaint Claiming Korea has Failed to Live Up to
Pact, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1269 (Sept. 21, 1988). Within the 45-day period in which the
USTR must decide whether or not to accept the petition, the USTR had negotiated a new
agreement which removed all limitations on the distribution of U.S. films, and the MPEAA
withdrew its petition. United States, South Korea Reach Accord on Movie Distribution,Avoiding 301 Case, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1444 (Nov. 2, 1988).
88. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 87, at 158, stating that "experience shows that retaliation under section 301 has been anything but swift, credible, or certain."
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A "loss-preventative" synthesis would recommend informal discussions with problem countries prior to designation as priority nations.
Thus, any industries threatened by harm through offensive foreign practices may act to cease or prevent unfair trade practices by: (1) tracking
changes in foreign policies designed to protect foreign industries through
inequitable intellectual property rights protection; (2) immediately and
aggressively attacking such changes; and (3) calling upon the USTR to
recognize inequitable policies and to introduce curative advances in intellectual property protection in any new trade agreements with offending
nations.
D. Section 301 Copyright Actions
The following matters were the only section 301 intellectual property investigations that included copyright issues. The cases illustrate the
variety of situations a section 301 petitioner may experience, from the
stalling in Brazilian Informatics to the rapidly-concluded Korean
agreement.
1. Brazilian Informatics
On September 16, 1985, under instruction from the President, the
USTR initiated an investigation into the Brazilian "Informatics Law,"
which was established in 1984 in order to promote development of a "national" informatics industry by restricting foreign competition.8 9 Pursuant to this authority, Brazil restricted the importation of informatics
products covered by this "market reserve" policy, including U.S. computers and computer-related products as well as a broad range of U.S.
products incorporating digital technology. 90 Additionally, U.S. subsidiaries located in Brazil were prohibited from manufacturing products covered by the market reserve policy. 91 Finally, Brazil withheld full
copyright protection for computer software resulting in heavy losses due
to software piracy. 9 ' These policies resulted in "rapid and unchecked
89. See generally Informatics Trade Problems with Brazil: Hearing before the Subcomm.
on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). At the time, Brazil's computer industry was the
sixth or seventh largest in the world but was treated by the Brazilian government as an infant
industry. Industry Representatives Strongly Oppose Brazil's Informatics Policy, Urge 301 Action, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 387 (Mar. 18, 1987) [hereinafter Industry Representatives].
90. 51 Fed. Reg. 35993 (1986).
91. Brazil severely restricted foreign investment, in some cases forcing out U.S. firms with
operations in Brazil. Id.

92. Id.
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proliferation of restrictions"9 3 with extensive lost sales to U.S. computer
companies. 94
On October 6, 1986, in an attempt to resolve the problem through
negotiation, the President instructed the USTR to "redouble" negotiating efforts and deferred the final decision to December 31, 1986. 9' The
USTR was also directed to inform the GATT of the United States' intent
to suspend the application of U.S. tariff concessions to Brazilian imports. 9 6 On December 9, 1986, Brazilian President Sarnay received the
final draft of Brazil's proposed software law, which provided twenty-five
year copyright protection for Brazilian and foreign-made software, imposed fines and jail sentences for violations, and regulated the registration of software through the Special Secretariat for Informatics in
Brazil.97 At the last minute, a provision allowing the establishment of
consortia of foreign and national businesses for the development, production, and merchandising of software was withdrawn. 98
Meetings held with the USTR three days later were apparently quite
positive and the United States further postponed retaliatory action until
July 1, 1987, pending resolution of the, consortium issue and passage of
the software protection legislation.9 9 The USTR was, however, directed
to conduct public hearings on Brazil's informatics policy and to solicit
private sector recommendations."
The hearings raised the following issues: (1) The proposed software did not meet international norms because it granted protection for only twenty-five, rather than fifty years;
(2) the legislation imposed obligations on foreign software owners who
authorize software reproduction and marketing by Brazilian distributors "to the point of almost constituting indirect forms of compulsory
licensing"; and (3) the Brazilian law of similars would not permit
the registration of software for hardware outside of the market re93. Id.
94. White House spokesperson Larry Speakes suggested that U.S. companies had already
lost approximately $1.5 billion in lost sales and projected losses of $8.1 billion by 1992 if the
current practices continued. White House Council Agrees to Pursue 301 Complaint with Brazil
over Informatics, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 685 (May 21, 1986).
95. 51 Fed. Reg. 35993, 35994 (1986).

96. Id.
97. Brazil Proposes New Software Law in Hopes of Resolving U.S. Informatics Complaint,
3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1495 (Dec. 10, 1986).

98. Brazilian business associations had lobbied for the provision, which would have allowed national partners to hold the Brazilian copyright for consortium-developed software
while foreign partners would have held the rights abroad. It was' removed following an debate
among Brazilian officials as to what Brazil could bargain with at a meeting scheduled with the
USTR three days hence. Id.
99.

US. Informs Brazil that Action Delayed until July 1 on Informatics Dispute, 3 Int'l

Trade Rep. (BNA) 1534 (Dec. 24, 1986).
100. Industry Representatives, supra note, 89.
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serve if "functionally equivalent programs" were available from Brazilian
companies. 1o

Despite such concerns, President Ronald Reagan suspended the intellectual property portion of the investigation, although he continued
discussions on investment barriers.1 2 This decision was severely criticized by Congress 10 3 and may have provided some of the impetus for the
later transfer of discretionary powers to the USTR. On November 13,
1987, President Reagan announced, the imposition of sanctions against
Brazil because of its failure to implement the computer software law in a
flexible, reasonable, and just fashion." °
After threatening to retaliate and appealing to the GATT, 05 Brazil
enacted the software law in December, 1987.106 U.S. software companies
generally applauded the new law, noting that the strong Brazilian market
has compensated them for their efforts toward enacting the law. 10 7 On
October 6, 1989, the USTR concluded the four-year investigation, noting
Brazil's willingness to continue consultations with the United States to
allow expanded business opportunities for U.S. computer and other elec101. Id. The Brazilian "attempt to implement the [functionally equivalent] phrase may
lead to such absurdities as denying registration to a new word processor program on the
grounds that Brazil already registered one word processor program, and therefore there is a
preexisting 'functional equivalent'." Id. (quoting Thomas White of the State Department).
102. PresidentSuspends Copyright Part of Brazil Case, But Talks Will Continue on Investment, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 867 (July 8, 1987).
103. House. Energy & Commerce Committee Chairman John Dingell (D-Mich) and the
Committee's ranking Republican, Norman Lent (R-NY), wrote a scathing letter to the USTR
noting that during the suspended retaliation periods, Brazil had introduced software legislation
"that was even worse than existing law" and that the President's action indicated an unwillingness "to take a tough stance against blatantly unfair practices." Id. Michael B. Smith, United
States Deputy Trade Representative, defended the action citing "political sensitivity and divided U.S. industry position" as well as the domestic political and economic issues facing the
Brazilian legislature which, under the first civilian government in years, was drafting a constitution. Administration Move on Brazil Informatics Comes Under CongressionalFire at Hearings, .4Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 930 (July 22, 1987).
104. The President stated that, "[I]n particular, the Brazilian government has rejected efforts by an American software company to license its product in Brazil, asserting that a domestic company makes a product that is 'functionally equivalent'." Brazil to Consider Retaliatory
Measures Following US. Announcement of Sanctions, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1419 (Nov.
18, 1987). The software company referred to was Microsoft Corporation who, along with six
Brazil firms, was denied a license for the sale of MS-DOS operating system in Brazil. Id.
105. Id.
106. In the process, Brazil's legislature attempted to impose a 200% ad valorem fee on all
foreign software sold in Brazil. Brazil's PresidentSarney Vetoes 200 PercentAd Valorem Fee
on New Software Legislation, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 18 (Jan. 6, 1988).
107. See Access to Brazil's Software Market Improved Under New Law, U.S. Executives,
Officials Say, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1077, 1078 (Aug. 16, 1989). Since enactment, approximately 2700 foreign software products have been approved, and 23 have been denied, for marketing in Brazil. Id.
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tronics hardware and software firms." °8 The decision was applauded by
the Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers Association,
whose president, John L. Pickitt, noted that the USTR would continue to
"pursue solutions outside the formal 301 process ... ."09 Hence, the
USTR has turned to the section 301 informal process to achieve future
results.
2. Korean Intellectual Property Rights
On November 4, 1985, the USTR initiated an investigation of South
Korea's lack of adequate and effective intellectual property protection.' 10
The USTR consulted with Korea through July, 1986, and, in sharp contrast to the protracted and highly-charged Brazilian Informatics matter,
announced an agreement on July 21, 1986.111 The agreement stipulated
that Korea would: (1) introduce for enactment by July 1, 1987, a comprehensive copyright bill protecting traditional works as well as computer programs; 112 (2) accede to the Universal Copyright Convention
and Geneva Phonograms Convention by October 1987; (3) provide domestic protection and adhere to international conventions for certain
product and process and microorganism patents; and (4) remove certain
restrictions on trademarked goods and licenses." 3
On March 10, 1988, the Pharmaceuticals Manufacturers Association charged that Korea had failed to keep the agreement." 4 In lieu of
accepting petitions filed by Bristol Myers Company and Squibb Corpora108. USTR Terminates Section 301 Investigation of Brazil's Informatics Sector Policies, 6
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1291 (Oct. 11, 1989).

109. Id. at 1292.
110. 50 Fed. Reg. 45883 (1985). The investigation was prompted by the denial of copyright protections to works by U.S. authors and by the lack of patent protection for chemical
compounds and compositions and process patent protection only for chemicals and
pharmaceuticals. U.S. Concludes Section 301 Investigation of Korea's Intellectual Property
Laws, 32 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 268 (July 24, 1986). The investigation was

applauded by the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA): "What happens in Korea will provide a framework for negotiations with all countries that do not at this time provide
adequate and effective protection for intellectual property. Because the copyright law that
results from the negotiations could very well be a model for the rest of the developing world,
the U.S. government must ensure that the law provide full, modern and complete protection

for foreign works." Note, supra note 8, at 446 n.198 (citing letter from the IIPA to Jeanne
Archibald, Office of the USTR).
111. U.S. Concludes Section 301 Investigation of Korea'sIntellectual PropertyLaws, 32 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 268 (July 24, 1986).
112. In addition, Korea would further study the feasibility of extending copyright protection to data bases as compilations, semiconductor chips, satellite telecasts, and cable television.

Id.
113.
114.

51 Fed. Reg. 29445 (1986).
USTR Requests Information on Korean Patent Protection, 36 Pat. Trademark & Copy-

right. J. (BNA) 306 (July 21, 1988).
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tion, the USTR set up an Interagency Fact Finding Task Force to determine whether treatment of foreign patent applicants and owners in
Korea or deficiencies in the patent enforcement system is discriminatory. 1. On May 25, 1989, South Korea was placed on the Special 301
priority watch list.116 On November 1, 1989, it was removed from the
priority list for having made "'steady progress' toward improving enforcement of intellectual property rights in its domestic market," such as
creating a task force to improve intellectual property rights and steppingup its enforcement of existing laws.'1 7 As noted in the next subpart, the
decision to remove South Korea from the priority list was criticized by
industry representatives, who believe that the situation has not significantly changed since Korea's May 25th priority list designation.
3. Special and Super 301 Actions
On May 25, 1989, the Administration named three Super 301 candidates: Brazil, cited for its improper restrictions, including import licensing; Japan, cited for barriers to supercomputers, satellites, and forest
products; and India, cited for barriers to investment and closed insurance
industry. 1 8 Japan reacted angrily to the announcement and rejected formal bilateral negotiations.' 9 Brazil called the designation "a unilateral
attempt to 'identify and define legal and legitimate Brazilian policies as
unfair trade practices' " and noted the "severe negative effect" the Super
301 measure would have on the Uruguay Round.120 India termed the
2
Administration's decision "totally unjustified, irrational, and unfair."' '
On June 16, 1989, the U.S. formally initiated investigations against
the Super 301 candidates.1 22 Since this time, the Indian government has
announced its intention to consider easing investment restrictions but reiterated its opposition to negotiating under the threat of trade
retaliation. 123
115. 53 Fed. Reg. 26706 (1988).
116. USTR Defends Administration's Naming of Japan, India, Brazil Under Super 301, 6
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) (May 31, 1989) [hereinafter Super 301 Actions Named].
117. Hills Removes Taiwan, Korea, Saudi Arabiafrom PriorityList, Five Countries Remain,
6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1436 (Nov. 8, 1989) [hereinafter PriorityList Removals].
118. Super 301 Actions Named, supra note 116.
119. Japan Rejects Bilateral Negotiations with US. Under Super 301 Provision, 6 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 686 (May 31, 1989).
120. Brazil Says U.S. Action Under Super 301 Will Have 'Negative Effect' on GATT Talks,
6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 688 (May 31, 1989).
121. Indian Trade MinisterSays US. Action is "Unjustified, Irrational,and Unfair," 6 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 688 (May 31, 1989).
122. U.S. FormallyInitiates 'Super301" Probesinto Trade PracticesofJapan, India, Brazil,
6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 797 (June 21, 1989).
123. India to Study Easing Investment Limits Cited Under Super 301, Ambassador Says, 6
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1087 (Aug. 23, 1989).
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On May 25, 1989, the Administration also named twenty-five countries to a Special 301 two-tier watch list, which requires countries to proceed with, or make significant progress on, negotiations regarding
intellectual property protection.1 24 The priority category, in which the
USTR requires improvements within 150 days, was composed of Brazil,
the People's Republic of China, India, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. 2 5 The second group of nations did not have
time limits for improvement specified: Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan,26the Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.
On November 1, 1989, the USTR downgraded the status of Taiwan,
South Korea, and Saudi Arabia after each country displayed "significant
commitments" to changing its intellectual property policies. 27 Saudi
Arabia had pledged to enact a copyright law that meets the obligations
contained in the Berne Convention and which would'apply to computer
software as well as to literary works. 128 Taiwan and South Korea had
both demonstrated a " 'strong commitment' to improving the climate for
1 29
intellectual property protection and to strengthening enforcement."
The International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) criticized
the removals, charging that the priority countries have not made significant progress since May 25, and warning that "if improvements are not
made by [April 30, 1990, the date of the next'Special 301 deadline], it
would seek the 'immediate designation' of some of the countries under
the Special 301 provision." 1 30 As to the removed countries, the IIPA
stated that it expected these countries to continue their efforts at improving intellectual property protection,' 3 ' presumably under informal section 301 procedures.
E. Section 301 Summary
Section 301's usefulness to U.S. industries has increased with the
1988 Trade Act. Tightening the investigation deadlines, removing presidential discretion, and mandating retaliation in certain instances certainly increases the impact of a section 301 formal proceeding. The
124. Super 301 Actions Named, supra note 116.

125. Id.
126. Id.
127. PriorityList Removals, supra note 117.

128. Id.
129. Id. Taiwan's representative to the United States, Eric Chaing, noted that Taiwan had
worked "especially hard" to modify its copyright laws and to resolve a dispute regarding pirating of Music Television (MTV) videotapes. Id. Korean officials pointed to new patent laws
about to be introduced to the Korean National Assembly for consideration. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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ramifications of the 1988 Trade Act, however, are equally as strong and
disturbing. First, as intellectual property is not covered by the GATT,
mandatory retaliation may well be a GATT violation. Apart from permitting retaliation by the injured country, GATT violations will impact
U.S. credibility in the Uruguay Round as well as other trade negotiations. Second; particularly with section 301's emphasis on sectoral reciprocity, the United States may be perceived as heavy-handed and
exercising a modem form of "gunboat diplomacy." With certain nations, this perception may increase resistance to modifying or enforcing
intellectual property protection. Third, the Super and Special 301 provisions are not working to the benefit of either the USTR or U.S. industry.
The USTR requires discretion in order to achieve the long-term goal of
"a level playing field," which requires adequate and equitable intellectual
property protection. Industry representatives want fast progress on intellectual property issues. Although not at odds with each other, there is a
tension between these long- and short-term goals as evidenced by the
USTR's creation of a watch list in order to avoid designating numerous
priority countries. As the actions discussed indicate, both the USTR and
industry is dissatisfied with the performance of Super and Special 301.
This Note suggests that the problems with GATT-consistency, the
perception of the United States as heavy-handed, and the tension between the USTR and industry representatives may be greatly alleviated
through the use of section 301 informal, as opposed to formal, proceedings. Thus, the proposed synthesis recommends early involvement in informal proceedings, prior to the development of difficulties. Such
informal discussions allow industry participation at every level-from
recognizing the existence of inadequate intellectual property protection
to consulting with the USTR during negotiations with the offending nations. Moreover, the informal procedures are entirely consistent with the
GATT. This cannot be said for any formal proceedings under section
301, regardless of whether retaliation is mandatory or merely permitted.
Thus, formal proceedings, and Super 301 proceedings in particular,
should generally be considered as a last resort.
If infringing products are imported into the United States, informal
proceedings should also be considered in conjuction with section 337
proceedings. The next part of this Note examines section 337 procedures, requirements, and actions, as well as its consistency with GATT
obligations.
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III
Section 337
Section 337 is intended to provide quick and effective protection for
domestic industries injured by unfair methods of competition and unfair
acts instigated by foreign concerns beyond the in personam jurisdiction
of United States courts. 13 2 Section 337 imposes strict time limits upon
the proceedings, requiring investigations to be concluded within twelve
months, with a six-month extension for cases designated as "more complicated."' 133 If a section 337 violation is found, "cease and desist" and/
or general exclusion orders 134 may be issued, provided such actions do
not conflict with the public interest.135 The determination and the action
are transmitted to the President who has sixty days to disapprove the
action for
"policy reasons," following which period the determination is
136
final.
Although established in 1930, section 337 was virtually unused prior
to 1975.137 However, as of September 1989, a total of 302 actions had
been filed, with 74% of the concluded actions resulting in either a settlement agreement or a finding of a section 337 violation and application of
the corresponding remedy. 138 Copyright actions demonstrate an even
better track record; of the thirteen complaints that included allegations
of copyright infringement, five have resulted in the issuance of general
exclusion or cease and desist orders, 139 six were terminated on the basis
132. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1986) allows the International Trade Commission to prevent
"[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United
States or in their sale by the owner, importer, consignee or agent of either, the effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially injure an industry, efficiently and economically
operated, in the United States, or to prevent the establishment of such an industry, or to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States ...
133. Id.at § 1337(b).
134. See discussion in Part IIIC, infra.
135. Following a finding ofa § 337 violation, the ITC must consult with interested agencies
as to the effect of an order upon the public welfare and competitive conditions in the United
States 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d), (f).
136. Id.at § 13370).
137. See INT'L TRADE COMM'N, SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS SINCE TRADE ACT OF

1974 (April 1989) (available at the Office of the Int'l Trade Comm'n, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter SECTION 337 TABLE OF CASES]. Section 337 was substantially revised in 1975. Pub. L.
85-686, 72 Stat. 679 (1975).
138. SECTION 337 TABLE OF CASES, supra note 137. In approximately 10 investigations,
the complainant failed to demonstrate the existence of a domestic industry; in another 11
investigations, substantial injury to a domestic industry was not shown. The majority of the
remaining failed investigations were terminated when the ITC concluded that the patent at
issue was invalid or was not infringed. See id.
139. Certain Coin Operated Audio-Visual Games and Components Thereof (viz., Galaxian), USITC Pub. 1160, Inv. No. 337-TA-87, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1212 (1981); Certain
Coin Operated Audio-Visual Games and Components Thereof (viz., Rally-X and Pac-Man),
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of a settlement agreement, 140 one was terminated upon the complainant's
motion,' and only one was dismissed for lack of a section 337 violation. 14 2 In view of the generally short commercial life of copyrighted
products and the future revenue loss associated with inferior-quality infringing copies, the existence of a quick and effective remedy to control
infringing imports is particularly significant. However, the paucity of
section 337 copyright actions suggests that in practice this is either an
underutilized or, at least prior to the 1988 Trade Act, an ineffective remedy for copyright infringement.
A.

Procedure

The International Trade Commission (ITC)'4 3 conducts section 337
proceedings as part of a broad range of "trade overseer" responsibilities. " A proceeding commences upon filing of a detailed complaint
with the ITC. '45 Within thirty days following receipt of the petition, or
as soon as possible thereafter, the ITC must decide whether to institute
USITC Pub. 1267, Inv. No. 337-TA-105, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1403 (1982), rev'd in part
sub nom. Bally/Midway Mfg. Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 714 F.2d 1117 (Fed.
Cir. 1983); Certain Personal Computers and Components Thereof, USITC Pub. 1504, Inv. No.
337-TA-140, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1140 (1984); Certain Cloisonne Jewelry, USITC Pub.
1822, Inv. No. 337-TA-195, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1955 (1986); Certain Soft Sculpture
Dolls, Popularly Known as "Cabbage Patch Kids," Related Literature and Packaging Therefor, USITC Pub. 1923, Inv. No. 337-TA-231, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1292 (1986).
140. Certain Surface Grinding Machines and Literature for the Promotion Thereof, Inv.
No. 337-TA-95 (1982); Certain Power Woodworking Tools, their Parts, Accessories and Special Purpose Tools, Inv. No. 337-TA-1 15 (1983); Certain High Precision Solenoids and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-I 19 (1983); Certain Radar Detectors and Accompanying
Owner's Manuals, Inv. No. 337-TA-149 (1984); Certain Microprocessors, Related Parts and
Systems, Inv. No. 337-TA-153 (1984); Certain Automatic Bowling Machine Printed Circuit
Boards, Inv. No. 337-TA-218 (1985).
141. Certain Hand-Operated, Gas-Operated Welding, Cutting and Heating Equipment and
Component Parts Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-132 (1932).
142. Certain Products with Gremlin Character Depictions, USITC Pub. 1815, Inv. No.
337-TA-201, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1585 (1986), aff'd sub noma., Warner Bros., Inc. v.
United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 787 F.2d 562 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
143. The ITC is composed of six members appointed by the President and approved by the
Senate. A Commissioner must be "possessed of qualifications requisite for developing expert
knowledge of international trade problems, and efficien[t] in administering the duties and functions of the [ITC]." Additionally, no more than three of the commissioners may be members
of the same political party. 19 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1986).
144. These responsibilities include studying and reporting to the President and Congress on
the general status of U.S. trade, with respect to the operation of customs laws, including their
effect on federal revenue and upon U.S. industries; investigating tariff relations between the
United States and foreign countries, including conditions, causes and effects relating to competition of foreign industries with those of the United States, as well as export/import comparisons; and compiling and analyzing statistical aspects of trade, e.g., ascertaining production
costs in principal U.S. manufacturing centers. Id. at § 1332.
145. 19 C.F.R. § 210.10(a), § 210.20 (1988). The ITC may also self-initiate proceedings.
Id. at § 210.10.
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an investigation.' 4 6 Notice of the commencement of an investigation
must be published in the Federal Register.' 4 7
The respondents, the foreign governments representing each respondent, and the various federal agencies that may be requested to advise the
ITC as to the "public interest," are served with a copy of the complaint
and notice of the investigation.1 4 Respondents have twenty days from
the date of service to respond in writing and under oath by admitting,
denying, or explaining each allegation; failure to do so is deemed an admission.' 49 Copies of the answers are forwarded to the complainant. 5°
Under the 1988 Trade Act, if a respondent fails to answer the complaint, the ITC must presume the allegations to be true and may issue an
exclusion order and/or a cease and desist order limited to that respondent. 5' Additionally, the 1988 Trade Act authorizes issuance of a general exclusion order when no respondents appear to contest the action
and the violation is established by "substantial, reliable, and probative
evidence." 5 2
The investigation is conducted in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act.' 53 The presiding officer is an administrative law
judge (ALJ)who conducts the hearing and writes an initial determination as to the existence of a section 337 violation within nine to fourteen
months depending on the complexity of the case.' 54 ITC regulations pro5 5 motions, 56
vide for the submission and consideration of amendments,
146. Id. at § 210.12.

147. Id. Should the ITC decide to reject the petition, the complainant must be presented
with written reasons for the determination. Id.
148. Id. at § 210.13.

149. Furthermore, respondents, must set forth the facts constituting any possible defense
and must include statistical data on the value and quantity of imports, respondent's capacity to
produce article and the relative significance of the U.S. market to its operations. Id.. at
§ 210.21.

150. Id.at § 210.13.

151. 1988 Amendments § 133 7 (g)(1), supra note 13. The ITC is still required, however, to
consider the effect of such orders upon the public interest.
152. Id. at § 1337(g)(2). Previously, complainants faced with nonappearing respondents
were forced to present evidence regarding infringement, the existence of a domestic. industry,

and substantial injury to that industry. Thus, this change will result in reduced costs and
speedier enforcement of copyrights should respondents fail to appear.

153. 5 U.S.C.

§§ 551-59 (1986).

154. 19 C.F.R. § 210.53(a) (1988).
155. Id. at § 210.22.
156. Id. at § 210.24.
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discovery, 15 7 depositions,15 8 interrogatories, 159 subpoenas,' 6° prehearing
62
16
and temporary relief.'
conferences,
Any party may move for summary judgment 163 or termination of
the investigation in whole or in part as to any or all' respondents. 6 An
order terminating an investigation is not considered a final determination
1 65
of an alleged section 337 violation.
The ITC adopts the AL's initial determination forty-five days after
filing 166 unless it orders a review of the determination within that period. 167 Review is directed if any one commissioner votes for it' 6 8 and is
169
limited to the ALJ-certified record.

If a violation is found, the ITC must serve the determination and the
resulting action to each party, 70 publish them in the Federal Register,
and transmit them to the President.' 7 ' The President has sixty days in
157. Id. at § 210.30.

158. Id. at § 210.31.
159. Id. at § 210.32.
160. Id. at § 210.35.
161. Id. at § 210.40.
162. See infra notes 239-42 and accompanying text for further discussion on temporary

relief.
163. 19 C.F.R. § 210.50.
164. Termination may result from a consent order or from a licensing or other.settlement
agreement. Id. at § 210.51.
165. Id. The 1988 Amendments explicitly provide that terminations on the basis of consent orders or settlement agreements are not determinative on the question of § 337 violations.
1988 Amendments § 1337(c), supra note 13.
166. If the determination involves an ancillary matter, such as a motion for temporary
relief or summary termination, the determination is final five days after filing.* 19'C.F.R.
§ 210.54.
167. A party may request an ITC review or the ITC may review on its own motion. Id. at
§ 210.53.
168. Id. at § 210.54.
169. Id. at § 210.56. Documents and testimony made subject to in camera orders are not
made part of the public record, although all other information and testimony admitted will be
considered as part of the record. See id. at §§ 210.43-.44.
170. An exclusion order is effective upon receipt by the Secretary of the Treasury who then
directs the Customs Department to enforce it; a cease and desist order is effective upon receipt
by the respondent. Id. at § 210.57.
171. Id. Articles subject to an exclusion order are entitled 'to entry under a bond (the
amount to'be determined by the ITC) until the determination is final. 1988 Amendments
§ 1337(e), supra note 13. The determination (including the remedy) is effective immediately
upon publication, but is not final until presidential approval is given or the statutory disapproval period is over. Young Eng'rs, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 721 F.2d
1305, 1311(Fed. Cir. 1983).
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which to notify the ITC of his disapproval for "policy reasons."' 172 Pas73
sage of that period without notification signifies presidential approval.
The President's veto power has been criticized for adding needless
uncertainty to ITC proceedings.1 74 This criticism is clearly undeserved.
The veto power has been exercised only four times 175 and, more importantly, fulfills its purpose of maintaining presidential discretion in foreign
trade matters. As will be discussed further, section 337 may violate the
United States' obligations under the GATT. It is therefore essential that
the President, privy to information that the ITC may not possess, retain
the ability to resolve disputes in a more appropriate, alternative manner
1 76
than that suggested by the ITC.
172. Although such "policy reasons" are not defined in the statute, they include, but are
not limited to, the "impact on United States foreign relations, economic and political ...[and]
upon the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy, the
production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and United States consumers." Duracell, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 778 F.2d 1578, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (quoting S. Rep. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 199 (1974)). The President is not required to articulate the reasons for his disapproval, but merely must state that the decision was
made "for policy reasons." Id. at 1581.
173. The President may explicitly approve the action during the 60-day period, resulting in
a final determination as of the date of ITC notification. 19 C.F.R. § 210.57 (1988).
174. Kennedy, supra note 87, at 151.
175. Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe & Tube, 43 Fed. Reg. 17789 (1978); Certain
Multi-ply Headboxes and Papermaking Machine Forming Sections, 46 Fed. Reg. 32361
(1981); Certain Molded-In Sandwich Panel Inserts, 47 Fed. Reg. 29919; and Certain Alkaline
Batteries, 50 Fed. Reg. 1655 (1985). In two of these cases, the President made it clear that the
remedy was the only reason for the disapproval and later approved refashioned remedies. Certain Multi-ply Headboxes, 47 Fed. Reg. 42847 (1982); Certain Molded-In Sandwich. Panel
Inserts, 46 Fed. Reg. 34437 (1981).
176. Congress apparently granted this discretionary authority on the belief that "the President would often be able to best see the impact which the relief ordered by the [ITC] may have
upon the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy, the
production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and United States consumers." Kennedy, supra note 87, at 153 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 199
(1974)). As these are the same "public interest" factors that the ITC is required to consider
prior to issuing an order, Kennedy infers Senate distrust regarding the ITC's ability to evaluate
the political and economic implications of issuing an order, and notes that such distrust is
probably unwarranted given the expertise and resources at the disposal of the ITC. Id.
This Note suggests that the Senate was not concerned with the ITC's lack of ability, but
was foreseeing the possibility of international trade conflicts arising from the application of
ITC remedies. See S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 199, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7186.
This view is supported by Federal Circuit decisions construing presidential disapproval as
not affecting the validity of the ITC's determination, thus allowing the ITC to refashion disapproved remedies and resubmit them for presidential approval. E.g., Young Eng'rs, Inc. v.
United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 721 F.2d 1305, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1983). In addition, the
presidential vetoes themselves have contained specific policy considerations pertaining to international relations. For example, in Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe & Tube, 43 Fed.*Reg.
17789, President Carter included as reasons for his disapproval (1) the detrimental effect of the
imposition of the remedy on international relations, and (2) duplication and conflicts in the
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Any party may file a petition to reconsider a determination within
fourteen days following service if new questions have been raised by the
1 78
determination and the ordered action. 177 An adversely affected party
may appeal the final determination to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) within sixty days. 179 However, presidential disapproval for policy reasons is not subject to review by the CAFC. 8 0
Neither a pending petition for reconsideration nor an appeal prevents
18 1
interim imposition of the recommended action.
In response to practitioners' concerns, the 1988 Trade Act amended
section 337 with respect to confidential business information and the
duty of candor. Section 337 now limits access to confidential information submitted in connection with an investigation to officials involved
with the investigation or review of the determination and to U.S. Customs officials responsible for administering any exclusion orders.1 8 2 In
response to these amendments, the ITC recently proposed new rules for
administration of unfair trade practice laws which would exacerbate trade relations between
Japan and the United States. President Carter suggested the imposition of a cease and desist
order under the circumstances would be viewed as an "unjustified burden on international
trade" and "would invite retaliation against United States exports [as well as] complicate our
current efforts to negotiate revisions of the international trading rules." Id. at 17790.
177. 19 C.F.R. § 210.60 (1988).
178. Adversely affected parties are not limited to the parties in the ITC proceedings. LSI
Computer Sys., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 832 F.2d 588 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
179. 1988 Amendments § 1337(c), supra note 13. The "appropriate function" of the Federal Circuit [hereinafter CAFC] is "to decide whether substantial evidence supports the facts
relied on and whether the [ITC's] determination, on the record, is arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion." Coming Glass Works v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 799 F.2d
1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1986). However, the CAFC may review the ALJ's findings because the
fact that the ITC confirmed the ALJ's initial determination makes the ALJ's findings necessary in reviewing a final determination of a section 337 violation. Akzo N.V. v. United States
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 808 F.2d 1471, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 909 (1987).
The CAFC does not have jurisdiction over ITC decisions that do not constitute final
determinations, such as: (1) Interlocutory orders, World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. United
States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 414 F. Supp. 713 (D.C. 1976); (2) advisory opinions, Allied Corp.
v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 850 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
791 (1989); or (3) decisions to terminate self-initiated investigations, Block v. United States
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1568, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Accordingly, a determination
unfavorable to the complainant may be appealed immediately, but if the determination is
favorable to the complainant and an order is issued, the respondent may not appeal until the
60-day presidential disapproval period is over. See Allied Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 782 F.2d 982, 984 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
180. Duracell, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 778 F.2d 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
181. See SSIH Equipment S.A. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 370
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
182. 1988 Amendments § 1337(n), supra note 13. Limited disclosure may be authorized
under a protective order issued by the ITC. Id.
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enforcing a complainant's duty of candor.' 8 3 The moving party must
prove a violation of this duty by clear and convincing evidence of a 'failure to disclose material information 8 4 and an intent to mislead.18 5
B. Requirements
Complainants must demonstrate the existence of an unfair act in the
importation of the good, the existence of a U.S. industry injured by the
unfair act, and that the injury was substantial. Prior to the 1988 Trade
Act, the complainant also had to show that the domestic industry was
economically and efficiently operated. These requirements will be reviewed below.
1.

UnfairActs

The definition of an unfair method of competition or unfair act in
importation of articles into the United States is broad, including copyright infringement, registered and common law trademark infringement,
patent infringement, induced infringement, trade secret misappropriation, passing or palming off, copying trade dress, false and deceptive advertising, failure to mark, and false designation of origin.' 8 6
In addition to unfair acts and methods of competition, the 1988
Trade Act specifically prohibits the importation, selling for importation,
or sales following the importation, of articles that infringe a valid and
enforceable U.S. registered copyright, patent, process patent, trademark,
187
or mask work.

183. Id. at § 1337(h), authorized the ITC to prescribe sanctions for abuse of discovery and
process to the extent authorized by Rules 11 and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Sanctions for violation include any combination of: (1) private or public reprimand by the
ITC; (2) suspension or disqualification from appearing before the ITC; (3) notification of professional associations or licensing authorities; (4) costs and attorney fees caused by duty violation; and (5) possible criminal prosecution by the Justice Department. 53 Fed. Reg. 44900,
44902-03 (1988) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. §§ 210.80-.85).'
184. "Material information" is defined as "a substantial likelihood that a reasonable decisionmaker would have considered the information important in deciding whether to institute
the investigation." 53 Fed. Reg. 44900, 44901 (1988).
185. Such intent includes gross negligence. Id.
186. See SECTION 337 TAaLE OF CASES, supra note 137. Additionally, predatory pricing,
tying arrangements; and other antitrust violations are presumably within the jurisdiction of the
ITC. However, such allegations have been infrequent, particularly since President Carter's
1978 disapproval of the ITC's determination in Certain Fabricated Steel Plate Products from
Japan, Inv. No. 337-TA-58 (1978). See id See also Lever, Unfair Methods of Competition in
Import Trade: Actions before the International Trade Commission, 41 Bus. LAW. 1165, 1172
(1986); Victor, Preventing Importation of Products in Violation of Property Rights, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 783, 784 (1987).
187. 1988 Amendments § 1337(a)(1)(B)-(D), supra note 13. These sections apply only if an
industry relating to the named intellectual property rights exists or is in the process of being
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2. Domestic Industry
In order for a complainant to invoke section 337, a domestic industry must be injured by a foreign concern's unfair acts or methods of competition. The existence of a domestic industry is determined on a caseby-case basis.' s8 There is no requirement that an industry be of a particular size,18 9 although it must be geographically located within the United
States. '9 0 Originally, manufacturing activities in the United States were
required,' 9 ' however, the ITC later expanded the definition of ."domestic
industry" to include service industries with substantial domestic repair
92
and installation activities.'
The most recent ITC decisions have identified a domestic industry
by measuring the "nature and significance of the activity" in the United
States.' 9 3 The "significance" factor is a quantitative measurement, often
appearing as a "value-added" test-for example, the ITC has found domestic industries to exist where U.S. quality control, repair, packaging,
marketing, distribution, or sale added half of a product's value.' 94 However, where the bulk of the manufacturing and quality control takes place
overseas, with only "ordinary sampling techniques" constituting the
quality control activities in the United States, the ITC has found no domestic industry.'9 5
established. Id. at § 1337(a)(2). See infra notes 202-03 and accompanying text for further
discussion.
188. The determination is made as of the date on which the complaint is filed rather than
the date of the ITC's determination. To do otherwise would vitiate the effect of § 337, because
the more successful infringers are at obtaining a market share, the smaller the domestic industry will be by the time the determination is rendered. Bally/Midway Mfg. Co. v. United States
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 714 F.2d 1117, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
189. In re Von Clemm, 229 F.2d 441, 444 (C.C.P.A. 1955).
190. Schaper Mfg. Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 717 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).
191. See id. at 1372.
192. Certain Airtight Cast Iron Stoves, USITC Pub. 1126, Inv. No. 337-TA-69 (Jan. 1981).
193. E.g., Schaper, 717 F.2d at 1372-3; Certain Cloisonne Jewelry, USITC Pub. 1822, Inv.
No. 337-TA-195, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1955 (1986).
194. See, e.g., Schaper, 717 F.2d at 1372; Certain Cloisonne Jewelry, USITC Pub. 1822,
Inv. No. 337-TA-195, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1955 (1986).
195. Eg., Schaper, 717 F.2d at 1368, aff'g Certain Minature Battery-Operated All-Terrain
Wheeled Vehicles, USITC Pub. 1822, Inv. No. 337-TA- 122, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1920
(1982). Schaper involved the infringement of a patent on certain toy vehicles imported into the
United States from an unlicensed Hong Kong manufacturer. Schaper manufactured the vehicles in Hong Kong through a licensed manufacturer and conducted research and development,
quality control, and sales activities in the United States. Schaper also manufactured all of the
accessories for the vehicles in the United States. The court approved the ITC's determination
that Schaper's domestic activities with respect to the vehicles did not constitute a domestic
industry. Furthermore, the court held that the domestic manufacture of toy vehicle accessories did not constitute a domestic industry with respect to the toy vehicles themselves: "[t]he
fact that the existence of the accessories derives from the toy vehicles does not make their
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"Domestic industry" has been defined in section 337 intellectual
property actions as the domestic operations of the complainant that are
devoted to the exploitation of the intellectual property right at issue.1 96
As a result, a distinction is made between the activities of "invention,"
e.g., research and development (R&D), and production-related activities,
e.g., manufacturing. Although invention and licensing are often necessary precursors to production, the ITC has never found R&D and licensing activities to be sufficiently "production-related" to comprise a
domestic industry. 9 7 The limitation is arbitrary, particularly with respect to intellectual property rights, the development of which often involves substantial R&D expenditures and where overseas manufacture
may be the most efficient way to recoup returns on capital, risk taking,
and entrepeneurial activities.19 8 As such, there is no apparent reason to
distinguish returns from R&D and licensing activities from the returns of
any other domestic activity.1 99
Complainants have repeatedly and unsuccessfully called upon the
ITC and the courts to recognize the vital economic role R&D and licensdomestic production by Schaper-regardless of the extent of Schaper's activities in manufacturing and producing them-a part of a toy vehicles industry in this action under section 337."
Id. at 1371.
The court affirmed the ITC's finding that Schaper's activities were too minimal to constitute an industry under § 337. Id. at 1373. See also Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 705 (1986) [hereinafter Trade Reform] (testimony of Donald
Dinan, former Acting Director, Unfair Imports Div., ITC).
196. See, e.g., Certain Products with Gremlin Character Depictions, USITC Pub. 1815,
Inv. No. 337-TA-201, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1585 (1986), aff'd sub nom., Warner Bros.,
Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 787 F.2d 562 (Fed. Cir. 1986):
197. The ITC has clearly stated that "design or licensing activities cannot be considered
part of the domestic industry because they [do] not involve either manufacture, production, or
servicing of the subject goods." Certain Soft Sculpture Dolls, Popularly Known as "Cabbage
Patch Kids," Related Literature and Packaging Therefor, USITC Pub. 1923, Inv. No. 337TA-231, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1292 (1986). Furthermore, the CAFC has stated that
nothing in § 337's legislative history would indicate that activities such as design, licensing,
and collection of royalties are meant to be protected. Schaper, 717 F.2d at 1371. This would
seem to be a historical limitation, reflecting the nature of economic activity in the United
States at the time of § 337's original enactment. However, the rule remains that a domestic
industry must be found to exist apart from any value added by the licensing or design activities. Certain Soft Sculpture Dolls, supra.

198. Industries built on developing and manufacturing souvenirs and functional products
representing popular commercial film characters are good examples. In such businesses, licensing programs are an integral part of the original money-making scheme. See Warner
Bros., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 787 F.2d 562 (Fed. Cir. 1986), aff'g Certain
Products with Gremlin Character Depictions, USITC Pub. 1815, Inv. No. 337-TA-201, 8 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1585 (1986).
199. See Trade Reform, supra note 195, at 80-82 (comments of the National Association of
Manufacturers) (suggesting a deficiency where significant economic activities are ruled not to
be a domestic industry, thus allowing substantial injury to go unpunished); Feinberg, Intellectual Property, Injury and International Trade, 22 J. WORLD TRADE 45, 51 (1988).
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ing activities play in the establishment and continuing vitality of an industry.2 °° Instead of acting affirmatively, courts have thrown the
gauntlet at Congress' feet: "If

. .

.present-day 'economic realities' call

for a broader definition to protect American interests (apparently including many of today's importers) it is for Congress, not the courts or the
[ITC], to legislate that policy." ''
Congress responded in the 1988 Trade Act by establishing a new
statutory definition of domestic industry with respect to certain explicitly-named intellectual property rights. In a copyright, patent, trademark, or mask work action, a domestic industry is now considered to
exist if there is: (1) significant investment in plants and equipment; (2)
significant employment of labor or capital; or (3) substantial investment
in the exploitation of the intellectual property right at issue, including
engineering, R&D, and licensing activities.20 2 This expansion of the intellectual property industry clearly aids complainants, particularly those
copyright holders whose businesses are built around foreign manufacturing. Additionally, broadening the definition of domestic industry should
allow practitioners to better project the feasibility and success of a section 337 action.20 3
The lower industry standard has not, however, met with complete
approval. It is quite probable that foreign litigants will utilize section
337 proceedings, regardless of whether they maintain an economic presence in the United States. 2" This is not necessarily undesirable since
200. E.g., Schaper, 717 F.2d at 1373 (proposed definition of "domestic industry" as a "significant employment of American land, labor and capital for the creation of value" flatly rejected); Warner Bros., 787 F.2d at 588 (despite acknowledging the "large sums of money" and
"significant personnel" involved in planning, developing, and executing a licensing program,
the ITC "has never determined that the servicing of intellectual property rights... qualifies as
the type of "servicing" activity that may be considered to be part of the domestic industry").
201. Schaper, 717 F.2d at 1373.
202. 1988 Amendments § 1337(a)(3), supra note 13. The last factor regarding exploitation
of intellectual property rights is presumably broad enough to include marketing, distributional,
and promotional expenditures.
203. However, several important gray areas remain; such as whether "significant" and
"substantial" should be measured in absolute or relative terms; and whether the value-added
test is still a correct measure of "significance" and, if so, how much "value" must be "added."
204. Removal of the industry requirement has the "anomalous result of permitting foreign
companies with no economic stake in plants or equipment in the United States to petition the
ITC to prevent U.S. companies from importing a component of a product for assembly in the
United States. Indeed... [it] would also permit a foreign company with no economic presence
in the United States to use the ITC to prevent another foreign company which also has no
economic presence in the United States from importing an article." Trade Reform, supra note
195, at 689 (comments of the ITC Trial Lawyers Association). Lest one think this is an idle
threat-almost half of the U.S. patents granted in 1987 went to non-U.S. holders. Section 337
Changes Could Increase Conflict with Other FederalLaws, ITC's Cass Says, 37 Pat. Trademark
& Copyright J. (BNA) 92, 93 (November 24, 1988) [hereinafter Cass' Remarks]. Seven of the

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.

[Vol. 12:99

strong intellectual property protection encourages the presence of, and
resultant benefits to, the protected articles in the United States. Nonetheless, such foreign utilization could fundamentally alter the purpose of
section 337-to protect U.S. industry.20 5
3.

Domestic Industry Economically and Officially Operated

Section 337 requires that a domestic industry be "economically and
efficiently operated" before any action may be taken. This phrase has
never been defined. Most of the data considered in determining economic and efficient operation is also relevant to determining the existence
of a domestic industry.20 6 Accordingly, section 337 relief has never been
denied because a "domestic industry" was not "economically and effi20 7
ciently operated.
In any event, the 1988 Trade Act discarded this requirement. Abolishing the requirement will reduce the discovery costs of a proceeding,
although the extent of the reduction is disputed.20 8
4. Substantial Injury
Section 337 requires the unfair acts to have "the effect or tendency
to destroy or substantially injure an industry, . . . or to prevent the
establishment of ...an industry, or to restrain or monopolize trade and
commerce in the United States." 20 9 The injury requirement serves to
"insure that the extreme and internationally provocative remedy contemplated [by Congress]-exclusion of imports from particular countrieswould be implemented only when this is compelled by strong economic
reasons."2 ' This requirement thus addresses the same concern as does
...

11 companies having the most U.S. patents granted in 1984 were foreign. Trade Reform, supra
note 195, at 692 (comments of the ITC Trial Lawyers Association).
205. See Trade Reform, supra note 195, at 687-93 (comments of the ITC Trial Lawyers
Association).
206. See, e.g., Certain Cloisonne Jewelry, USITC Pub. 1822, Inv. No. 337-TA-195, 7 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1955 (1986).
207. See SECTION 337 TABLE OF CASES, supra note 137.
208. Ronald Cass, an ITC Commissioner, has suggested that the deletion of this requirement is probably the most significant change in § 337 and will result in extensive cost savings.
Cass' Remarks, supra note 204.
209. 1988 Amendments § 1337(a), supra note 13.
210. Textron, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 753 F.2d 1019, 1028 (Fed. Cir.
1985). First, the injury requirement establishes the necessity of § 337's extraordinary relief by
showing that domestic remedies are inadequate, thus permitting application of § 337 under
Article XX(d) of the GATT. Additionally, the substantial injury requirement acts as a substitute for the domestic due process requirement that demands proof of infringement by particular individuals before relief is granted, thus allowing issuance of an in rem exclusion order
without violating the national treatment obligation of the GATT. See Part IIID for a discussion of § 337's conformity to GATT obligations.
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the presidential veto: permitting discretion in the imposition of internationally objectionable remedies.
The ITC has terminated at least eleven investigations for failure to
prove substantial injury to a domestic industry.2 1 The criteria for a finding of substantial injury include lost or declining sales; decreases in domestic production and profitability; decreases in the volume of imports
and their degree of market penetration; underselling; reduction in the
complainant's prices;2 12 decline in domestic employment and investment; 21 3 and loss to intangible business assets, such as goodwill. 214 Sales
figures are apparently crucial; in most cases where no injury was found,
the ITC described the complainant's sales or profits as increasing or
excellent.2 15
The complainant bears the burden of showing a causal connection
between the injury and the infringing imports. If a relevant market includes non-infringing alternatives, this showing may be a difficult task,
requiring proof of a market shift to the infringing imports.2 16
The injury criteria have been criticized as "descriptions of the health
of the industry" and more illustrative of supply and demand conditions
in the industry and in the U.S. economy than of the effects of the unfair
act.2 17 The criteria are also "at odds with the [commonly held] view that
the holder of an intellectual property right should be able to exploit it
fully and exclusively. '2 18 In other words, that harm should be presumed
when infringement of any intellectual property right occurs. The stringent injury requirement thus clearly illustrates congressional intent in
enacting section 337: it is a remedy that should be utilized only when a
district court cannot provide the extraordinary relief necessary to protect
an industry.2 19
The ITC and the CAFC have found the requisite injury in intellectual property cases with a smaller quantum of proof than that required in
211. See SECTION 337 TABLE OF CASES, supra note 137.
212. Coming Glass Works v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 799 F.2d 1559, 1563
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
213. Id. at 1571.
214. Certain Cloisonne Jewelry, USITC Pub. 1822, Inv. No. 337-TA-195, 7 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1955 (1986).
215. Feinberg, supra note 199, at 53.
216. See Fischer & Porter Co., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 831 F.2d 1574,
1577 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
217. Feinberg, supra note 199, at 52-53.

218. Id.
219. "[S]ection 337 does not function merely as an international extension of private
rights" under the intellectual property statutes, thus standards different from those of federal
courts are applied. Coming Glass Works v..United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 799 F.2d 1559,
1567 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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non-intellectual property cases.22 ° In one matter, the CAFC came close
to adopting a presumed harm standard by stating that "a relatively small
loss of sales may establish ... the requisite injury to the portion of the
complainant's business devoted to the exploitation of . . . intellectual
property rights."' 22 1 While this holding would suggest that a business
devoted solely to the exploitation of intellectual property rights, such as
licensing, should be able to presume harm with infringement, that idea
has been repeatedly rejected.2 22 Instead, the injury test still appears to
require uncontroverted proof of substantial loss of sales or market
share.2 23
The 1988 Trade Act differentiates copyright, patent, trademark, and
mask work infringement from other unfair methods of competition by
224
removing the injury requirement with respect to these unfair acts.
Thus, if a domestic industry exists, injury is presumed with a showing of
infringement of a valid and enforceable intellectual property right.
Omitting the injury requirement in intellectual property actions was
clearly a correct decision, recognizing the realities underlying intellectual
property-dependent industries. Newly-emerging, high technology industries often demonstrate excess demand over supply and declining prices.
Using these factors to deny the existence of substantial injury has resulted in conflicting ITC and CAFC decisions. More importantly, foreign infringers have thereby been granted a toe-hold in the U.S. market
at the expense of the rightful intellectual property right owner, who has
lost the opportunity to reap where it has sown.22 5 In addition, presuming
injury will make ITC litigation more predictable and will probably re220. E.g., Textron v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 753 F.2d 1019, 1029 (Fed. Cir.
1985); Fischer & Porter Co., 831 F.2d at 1577.
221. Bally/Midway Mfg. Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 714 F. 2d 1117, 1124
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
222. For example, in Corning the CAFC rejected the argument that any "conceivable loss
of sales" should be sufficient to show injury, stating that it will not eliminate the injury requirement because of the extraordinary remedy sought. Corning, 799 F.2d at 1566.
223. E.g., injury is established when the "infringer holds, or threatens to hold, a significant
share of the domestic market in the covered articles or has made a significant amount of sales
of the articles." Textron, 753 F.2d at 1029.
224. 1988 Amendments § 1337(a)(1), supra note 13.
225. This situation was demonstrated by the anomalous results in the following actions.
Coming Glass Works filed a § 337 complaint against Sumitomo Electric Industries, a Japanese
corporation, for importing certain optical waveguide fibers that infringed Coming's U.S. patents. Certain Optical Waveguide Fibers, Inv. No. 337-TA-189 (1984), aff'd sub nom., Coming
Glass Works v. Sumitomo Electric Industries, 799 F.2d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The imports
were manufactured in Japan and sold through Sumitomo's U.S. subsidiary. The ITC found
that the corresponding patents were infringed by Sumitomo's imports and that a domestic
industry existed. Corning, 799 F.2d at 1563. Coming suggested that the determination of
injury should take into account the stage of development of the industry. However, the ITC
found no substantial injury with respect to past sales primarily because (1) Coming was im-
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duce costs significantly. 26 However, the omission of an injury requirement for intellectual property rights is frequently criticized, primarily
because it may transform the ITC into a forum for intellectual property
litigation. 227 Critics have also argued that an injury requirement reduces
porting fiber as its domestic capacity could not meet the burgeoning consumer demand, and
(2) Coming's sales did not decline during the disputed period. Id. at 1569-70.
Sumitomo intended to open a fiber manufacturing plant in the United States. Despite
Coming's arguments that Sumitomo's infringing imports had allowed it to gain a toe-hold in
the market at Coming's expense, the ITC refused to consider evidence of prospective sales of
U.S. manufactured goods, holding that only sales of imports could be taken into account in
finding a tendency to substantially injure. Id. at 1570-71. Thus, the result: the economic success of Coming's patented product not only disallowed protection for past loss of market
share, but also legitimized future market losses resulting from Sumitomo's entry to the market,
all to the detriment of Coming's future revenue.
Decided four months after Corning,Akzo N. V v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n similarily involved allegations of patent violation and attempts to exploit the applications and penetrate the market created by the complainant, E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company
(DuPont). 808 F.2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1986), aff'g Certain Aramid Fibers, Inv. No. 337-TA-194
(1984). In this matter, however, an exclusion order was granted. The injury determination
was based on a finding that DuPont's business would be injured during the remaining life of
the patent due to a probable price reduction, and corresponding revenue loss, by DuPont in
response to Akzo's entry into the market. Akzo, 808 F.2d at 1487. In contrast to Corning, the
CAFC held that a "conceivable loss of sales" is sufficient to establish a tendency to substantially injure, finding this standard to be "entirely consistent with the legislative history of [section 337]." Id.Even more curiously, the court approved the "stage of development" theory it
had rejected in Corning. Id. at 1487-88.
The distinguishing factor between the outcomes appears to be profit: in Akzo, the complainant had yet to realize a profit; in Corning, the complainant's profits were described as
good. Thus, the crucial issue is one of subjective equity rather than objective injury: has the
complainant already received a fair share of the pie.
226. The General Accounting Office (GAO) estimates that one-half of the $250,000 to $1
million cost of bringing a § 337 investigation is attributable to the injury requirement. Reform
of Section 337 of TariffAct of 1930 Debated at Chicago Meeting, 32 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 80, 81 (May 22, 1986). However, ITC Commissioner Ronald Cass disputes
this figure, pointing out that injury findings are often channeled into other issues such as infringement. Cass' Remarks, supra note 204, at 93. Additionally, these factors are reviewed by
the ITC when considering the public interest, and by the President following an affirmative
finding. As a result of removing the injury requirement, the factors would be removed from a
due process record but used in a quasi-judicial hearing following the determination. In the
view of the ITC Trial Lawyers Association, it would be "fairer for all of those involved [to
have a due process record of the factors] rather than [to] come in afterwards and not have the
same opportunities as an adversary to develop the facts." Trade Reform, supra note 195, at
722 (testimony of Paul Plaia, Chairman, Legislation Committee, ITC Trial Lawyers
Association).
227. Easing of a domestic industry requirement and deletion of an injury requirement
make § 337 even more substantively similar to other intellectual property laws. There are
three concerns associated with this similarity. First, if the ITC is perceived as an intellectual
property forum, it will serve the same function as a district court. However, with specialized
remedies and the absence of counterclaims, § 337 is open to attack by GATT signatories as a
non-tariff barrier. See Trade Reform, supra note 195, at 688 (comments of the ITC Trial
Lawyers Association). Second, ITC commisioners are required to be qualified in international
trade, not legal doctrine; thus, transforming the ITC into a court may be inappropriate. House
Subcommittee Holds Hearings on Section 337 Reform, 31 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.
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possible conflicts with international trade obligations and negotiations.228
This is not a sound argument as the focus in the GATT-arena is on the
necessity of the remedy-not the extent of the injury. It is true, however,
that the spectre of international trade conflicts may result in increased
presidential disapproval of ITC actions for policy reasons, thereby actually decreasing the predictability of section 337 actions.
C. Remedies Authorized Under Section 337
If a violation is found, the ITC must consider the effects of an exclusion order or a cease and desist order on the public interest and determine the appropriate action. 229 The ITC may tailor remedies to fit
particular offenses. For example, the ITC might issue a cease and desist
order preventing inventory sales against certain respondents in conjunction with a general exclusion order against all respondents preventing
further importations.2 30 Damages will not be awarded in section 337
proceedings.2 3 1
A general exclusion order is a remedy in rem, covering all violating
imports, regardless of whether the specific manufacturer participated in
the proceedings or whether personal jurisdiction over such manufacturers could have been obtained, thus making it an extremely potent remedy. It is granted when the pattern of infringement and the business
conditions are such that it is reasonable to conclude that foreign manufacturers other than respondents may attempt to enter the U.S. market
with similar infringing articles.23 2 An exclusion order is effective upon
(BNA) 532, 533 (Apr. 17, 1986) (citing Representative Robert Kastenmeier (D-Wis), who
noted that at the time, five of the six ITC Commissioners were not attorneys). Finally, separate bodies of law are developing in the ITC and in federal and state courts that create "all
sorts of possibilities for difficulties arising [from and] tensions between the different sorts of
proceedings." Cass' Remarks, supra note 204, at 93.
228. See infra note 256.
229. The public interest includes "the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in
the United States economy, the production of like or directly competitive articles in the United
States, and United States consumers ..
" 1988 Amendments § 1337(d), supra note 13.
230. Eg., Certain Compound Action Metal Cutting Snips, Inv. No. 337-TA-197, 8 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1307 (1986).
231. Although a contemporaneous federal district court suit is possible, it increases costs
considerably. Whether this is a significant factor depends upon the type of industry concerned
as well as the stage of development of the particular business. For example, a newly-emerging
high-technology business may discover that its future, or perhaps its very existence, may de-

pend upon the speed of the proceedings. Thus, its main concern would be stopping infringement quickly, with the issue of monetary compensation a secondary concern.
232. See, e.g., Certain Coin-operated Audiovisual Games, USITC Pub. 1160, Inv. No. 337TA-87, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1212 (1981). With respect to "business conditions," the ITC
has considered:
(1) established demand for product in the U.S. market and conditions of the world
market; (2) the availability of marketing and distribution networks in the U.S. for
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receipt by the Secretary of the Treasury and remains in effect until the
Treasury is notified that the conditions that led to the issuance of the
order no longer exist.233 The order is enforced by the Customs
Department.
The 1988 Trade Act allows seizure and forfeiture of infringing imports if: (1) the owner or importer previously attempted to import the
articles into the United States; (2) the article was previously denied entry
by an exclusion order; and (3) the owner was given notice by the Secretary of the Treasury that seizure and forfeiture would result from any
further attempts to import the article.23 4 Although this provision is useful, similar provisions already exist in the Customs Department regulations as well as in the Copyright Act, thus the extent of the punitive and
deterrent effects of seizure and forfeiture under section 337 are
unknown.23 5
A cease and desist order prohibits a respondent from engaging in the
unfair act and is often used to prevent sales of pre-existing inventories in
the United States.2 36 If a cease and desist order is violated, a civil penalty
is imposed.23 7 The ITC may recover the penalty for the benefit of the
23
United States in a federal suit.
potential foreign manufacturers; (3) the cost to foreign entrepenuers of building a
facility capable of producing the articles; (4) the number of foreign manufacturers
whose facilities could be retooled to produce the article; or (5) the cost to foreign
manufacturers of retooling their facilities to produce the article.
Id.
233. 1988 Amendments § 1337(h), supra note 13.
234. Id. at § 1337(i).
235. See 19 C.F.R. § 133.52 (1988); 19 U.S.C. § 603 (1986). The ITC Trial Lawyers Association asserts that such duplication of remedies is not necessary because there have been few
problems with enforcement. Trade Reform, supra note 195, at 704. However, one survey
indicated that nearly two-thirds of the firms that had received exclusion orders found that
counterfeited goods covered by the order continued to enter the country in smaller numbers.
Intellectual PropertyRights, supra note 11, at 237 n.38 (statement of Allan Mendelowitz, Associate Director, National Security and International Affairs Div., General Accounting Office).
Because Customs was only authorized to exclude goods covered by an order, foreign infringers
would re-export the goods losing only shipping charges. Id. Thus, seizure and forfeiture have
been applauded as necessary remedies to halt "port shopping." See id. at 238.
236. Eg., Certain Cloisonne Jewelry, USITC Pub. 1822, Inv. No. 337-TA-195, 7 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1955 (1986).
237. Prior to the 1988 Trade Act, the penalty was the greater of $10,000 per day or the
value of all articles entering or sold in the United States on each day. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(2)
(1986). The 1988 Trade Act raised the penalty to the greater of $100,000 per day or twice the
value of all articles entering or sold in the United States. 1988 Amendments § 1337(f)(2),
supra note 13.
238. 19 U.S.C. § 1377(f)(2); 1988 Amendments § 1337(f)(2), supra note 13.
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Codifying current ITC practice,2 39 the 1988 Trade Act gives the
ITC authority to grant preliminary relief in the form of cease and desist
orders or temporary exclusion orders to the same extent as the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure allow preliminary injunctions and temporary
restraining orders. 24
" Thus, even if the ITC believes that a section 337

violation is occurring, it will not issue preliminary relief unless the complainant demonstrates that immediate and substantial harm will occur
prior to the final determination. 2 ' The 1988 Trade Act reduced the period within which the ITC must rule with regard to temporary relief to
ninety days, or 150 days for a "more complicated case," following the
publication of notice in the Federal Register.24 2
The 1988 Trade Act allows section 337 litigants to petition for a
determination that they are no longer in violation (advisory opinions)
and for modification or rescission of relief.243 In all cases, relief will be
granted only on the basis of undiscovered evidence or on other grounds
which permit relief from a judgment under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 24
D. Section 337 and the GAT
The issue of GATT consistency boils down to whether section 337
remedies are "necessary" to provide the same degree of enforcement
against foreign infringers that the domestic intellectual property laws
239. E.g., Certain Floppy Disk Drives, Inv. No. 337-TA-215, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
2531 (1985).
240. 1988 Amendments § 1337(e)(3), supra note 13. However, articles subject to. a temporary exclusion order are entitled to entry under bond, the amount to be determined by the
ITC. Id. at § 1337(e)(1).
241. The ITC will consider: (1) complainant's probability of success on the merits; (2)
immediate and substantial harm to industry in the absence of temporary relief; (3) the possible
harm to respondents if temporary relief granted; and (4) the possible effect temporary relief
might have on public interest. 19 C.F.R. § 210.24(e) (1988). See Certain Products with Gremlin Character Depictions, USITC Pub. 1815, Inv. No. 337-TA-201, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
1585 (1986), for application of these factors.
242. 1988 Amendments § 1337(e)(2), supra note 13. In a "more complicated" case, the
complainant may have to post a bond before a temporary exclusion order is issued. Id. While
the time limits are particularly appropriate for the generally short economic lives of copyrighted articles, patent cases may be more problematic because the high standards required for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction in patent cases necessitate longer discovery. See Trade
Reform, supra note 195, at 701 (comments of the ITC Trial Lawyers Association). The simplest solution is probably to designate patent cases as "more complicated."
243. 1988 Amendments § 1337(k)(2), supra note 13.
244. Id. An advisory opinion or an order modifying relief may necessitate an entirely new
proceeding with issues different from those previously litigated. Thus, this vague standard will
probably provoke additional litigation as to what is or is not "new evidence" and "evidence
which could not be presented earlier." See Trade Reform, supra note 195, at 702 (comments
of the ITC Trade Lawyers Association).
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provide against domestic infringers.2 45 This question has two parts: (1)
whether the remedy of a general exclusion order is necessary; and (2)
whether the existence of a separate ITC procedure is necessary.24 6
The first issue was raised in a complaint raised by Canada against
the United States (the "Canada Report") arguing that, because no analogue to general exclusion orders exists in domestic infringement actions,
such orders constitute excessive enforcement against foreign products.2 47
The United States justified general exclusion orders on the grounds that
the jurisdictional difficulties in obtaining effective damage awards against
foreign infringers rendered such remedies ineffective as a deterrent
against continued infringement. 248 The GATT Panel decided that those
facts justified a general exclusion order under the "necessity" exception
of Article XX(d).2 49
The decision .

.

. appear[ed] to rest on the ground that the specific

product in question was easy to copy, that infringement by other foreign suppliers was thus a substantial danger, and that, in this case, the
danger could not effectively be deterred or controlled by domestic infringement
actions against either foreign producers or domestic
250
users.
The Panel's decision did not, therefore, resolve the fundamental question
of the legitimacy of general exclusion orders.
In a recent ruling, a GATT Panel considered a complaint filed by
the European Community regarding a section 337 patent action involving a Netherlands corporation (the "EC Report"). 21 Directly addressing exclusion orders, the Panel found that both limited and general
exclusion orders violated the national treatment obligation, but that limited exclusion orders could be justified by Article XX(d)'s necessity ex245. See supra note 15, discussing GATT national treatment obligation and the "necessity"
exception.
246. Intellectual Property and Trade, supra note 15, at 196 (statement of Professor Robert
Hudec, University of Minnesota Law School).
247. Id. at 197. The complaint was raised following issuance of a general exclusion order
against Canadian respondents in Certain Spring Assemblies, Inv. No. 337-TA-88.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 197-98.
251. United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Panel Report 2.91 (February
1989) [hereinafter EC Report] (available from the ITC). The ruling followed the filing of a
complaint alleging violation of the GATT national treatment obligation by the European
Community in response to a general exclusion order issued against the products of a Netherlands company that had been found to infringe patents held by E.I. du Pont de Nemours and
Company. Certain Aramid Fibers, Inv. No. 337-TA-194, aff'd, Akzo NV v. United States
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 808 F.2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
The CAFC used a broad definition of injury in deciding the matter: a "conceivable loss of
sales" was sufficient to establish a tendency to substantially injure. Akzo, 802 F.2d at 1487.
The European Community did not raise any issues with respect to the injury requirement,
confirming that the injury requirement is irrelevant to GATT consistency.
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emption as "the functional equivalent of an injunction enjoining named
domestic manufacturers." 25' 2 This rationale did not hold true for general
exclusion orders, although the Panel suggested that general exclusion orders may be justified as "necessary" under Article XX(d) in certain
situations.2 53
Although the GATT will review the necessity of exclusion orders on
a case-by-case basis, the Canada Report factors are commonly found in
section 337 copyright infringement actions. Moreover, even the EC Report acknowledged that preventing importation at the border could require the issuance of general exclusion orders.254 The Customs
Department has freely admitted its inability to prevent widespread importation of infringing products, absent general exclusion orders.2 5
Thus, it is quite possible that the application of general exclusion orders
to prevent ' ' 2such
importation would, in most cases, be' considered
56
"necessary.

The second, and more serious, issue was the focus of the EC Report.
Basing its decision on features of section 337 prior to the 1988 Trade Act
amendments, the GATT Panel concluded that section 337 "is inconsistent with Article III:4, in that it accords to imported products challenged
as infringing United States patents treatment less favorable than the
treatment accorded to products of United States origin similarly challenged, and that these inconsistencies cannot be justified in all respects
under Article XX(d). '' 2 1 7 The specific elements found to violate the national treatment clause were: the restriction on raising counterclaims in
252. EC Report, supra note 251, at
5.31-.32.
253. Id. at 5.32.
254. [T]he Panel did not rule out entirely that there could sometimes be objective
reasons why general in rem exclusion orders might be "necessary" in terms of Article
XX(d) against imported products even though no equivalent measure was needed
against products of United States origin. For example, in the case of imported products it might be considerably more difficult to identify the source of infringing products or to prevent circumvention of orders limited to the products of named persons,
than in the case of products of United States origin.
Id.
255. See Unfair Foreign Trade Practices, supra note 21, at II (testimony of William von
Raab, Commissioner, Unite States Customs Service).
256. Note that the presence or absence of an "injury" requirement is irrelevant; if § 337
remedies are necessary to the adequate enforcement of intellectual property rights, it does not
make any difference whether the injury requirement exists. If § 337 remedies are not "necessary" to the enforcement of intellectual property rights, then omission of the requirement does
not make the law any more or less GATT-conforming. Intellectual Propertyand Trade, supra
note 15, at 175-76.
257. EC Report, supra note 25 1, at 6.3. interested third parties submitted arguments-all
in favor of the European Community's position-alleging that the use of a separate and distinct adjudicatory process is a denial of the national treatment obligation and that § 337 is
protectionist and constitutes a disguised restriction on trade. See id. at
4.2-.8.
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section 337 proceedings as opposed to federal courts; the complainants'
opportunity to choose a forum in which to challenge imported products,
but not products of U.S. origin; the possibility. that foreign respondents,
but not those whose products originate in the United States, will have to
litigate in both federal court and the ITC; and the potential disadvantage
to respondents of short and fixed time limits under section 337 when no
comparable time limits apply to suits involving products of U.S. origin." According to the Panel, these extra burdens cannot be justified
under Article XX(d) because an alternative measure is available that the
United States "could reasonably be expected to employ and which is not
inconsistent with other GATT provisions .... "29 This measure would
consist of granting the remedial powers and procedural regulations of
section 337 to a federal district court, thereby treating products of either
foreign or U.S. origin equally. 2"
The United States blocked adoption of the Panel Report by the
GATT for nine months. As United States Trade Representative Carla
Hills noted, "while it [is] 'troubling' to block a report, the ruling could
have wide ranging implications for international law. Acceptance of the
report would mean that the United States would have to take action to
bring section 337 into compliance with GATT rules."26' 1
The blocking had a severe impact on the Uruguay Round negotiations.2 62 In December 1989, the USTR reconsidered the international
trade implications, deciding that effective dispute procedures were more
advantageous to U.S. trade interests than continued blocking of the EC
Report. 263 The Administration apparently believes that adopting the EC
258. Id.
259. Id. at 5.26.
260. Because the question was not specifically raised, the Panel did not conclude whether
the differences in treatment could be traced to the structure of the ITC as an administrative
agency and not a court of law, and thus whether this structural difference itself violated Article
III. Id. at 5.21. However, the Panel clearly believed that a reasonable "alternative measure"
would be to treat products of foreign and U.S. origin similarly, either by allowing § 337 actions
against U.S. goods or by granting federal district courts the same powers as the ITC possesses.
See, e.g., id. at 5.32 (general exclusion orders consistent with Article 1:4 if they were available
"in like situations" against products of U.S. origin). Given the generally non-legal make-up of
the ITC, the latter suggestion is more plausible.
Robert Hudec believes that the "necessity" could be justified under Article XX(d) "if
there were in fact some basic constitutional impediment to empowering district courts with the
kind of remedial powers needed." See Intellectual Property and Trade, supra note 15, at 201.
However, Hudec concludes that, except for the Presidential veto which may raise problems
under Article III of the Constitution, there would be no constitutional difficulty with empowering the federal courts to administer § 337 remedies. Id. at 205.
261. See US Continues to Block GATT Section 337 Report to Allow Further Study, Hills
Says, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1024 (Aug. 2, 1989).
'262. See Decisions by GATTAccepted, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1989, at Cl, col. 6.
263. Id.
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Report will, by itself, satisfy the GATT members, allowing the Uruguay
Round to progress. There is no move to amend section 337 to comply
with the GATT and, indeed, President Bush has remarked that he would
26
continue "to enforce section 337 without change."
It seems clear that, if the presidential veto power is maintained, exclusion orders may be consistent with GATT obligations. It appears to
be only a matter of time, however, that the United States will be forced to
make a choice between amending section 337 to treat foreign and domestic parties equally, and thus meet the GATT's nondiscrimination requirement, or enforcing section 337 as it currently exists and thereby
guaranteeing the eventual demise of the GATT as a credible, effective
international trade treaty.
E. Section 337 Copyright Actions
The following examples illustrate the variety and success of copyright infringement actions brought under section 337. As noted above,
other than the Gremlins matter reviewed below and one other action terminated on the complainant's motion, every section 337 copyright action
has resulted in an exclusion order or a settlement agreement.
265
1. Rally-X and Pac-Man

Bally/Midway Manufacturing Company filed a petition alleging, inter alia, copyright infringement of their copyrighted video games PacMan and Rally-X. The ITC adopted the AL's findings that the registered copyrights on the audiovisual works were valid and were infringed
by respondents. 26 6 Domestic industry was defined as "that portion of
[the] complainant's business devoted to the exploitation of the intellectual property rights in issue," and a domestic industry was found to exist
for Pac-Man.2 67 Following a finding of substantial injury, the ITC issued
a general exclusion order against imports that infringed the Pac-Man
copyright.2 68
With respect to Rally-X, the ITC concluded that a domestic industry did not exist, citing low inventories and the current absence of manufacture and marketing of Rally-X.26 9 Upon appeal, the CAFC noted that
264. Id. at C2, col. 4.
265. Certain Coin Operated Audio-Visual Games (viz., Rally-X and PacMan), USITC
Pub. 1267, Inv. No. 337-TA-105, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1403 (1982), rev'd in partsub nom.
Bally/Midway Mfg. Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 714 F.2d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
266. Bally/Midway, 714 F.2d at 1120.
267. Id.
268. The ITC cited lost sales to identical but substantially cheaper infringing imports as the

basis for its injury finding. Id.
269. Id.
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"a particular video game generally has only a brief period of popularity,
accompanied by high production and sales,"'2 7° and recognized that, in
many cases, infringing imports could destroy a domestic industry before
the ITC could complete the investigation. 27 1 Based on the sale of a "substantial number of Rally-X games" prior to and during the investigation,
the CAFC found that a domestic industry existed.2 72 After determining
that the Rally-X industry had been substantially injured through the sale
of a "significant" number of infringing games,2 73 the matter was remanded to the ITC for further proceedings on relief,2 7 4 which resulted in
the issuance of a general exclusion order eight months later. 275
2.

2 76

Apple Computers

Apple Computer, Inc. filed a complaint alleging, inter alia, infringement of its registered copyrights in Autostart ROM,27 7 an operating system program embedded in a ROM chip, and in Applesoft, an interpreter
program stored in a ROM chip. The ITC determined that the copyrights
were valid and infringed by imported personal computers. 2 7' Additionally, the ITC determined that the respondents had contributorily infringed 27 9 Apple's copyrights with regard to ROM-less computers and
270. Id.at 1119.
271. The CAFC therefore instructed the ITC to make industry and injury findings as of the
date on which the complaint was filed. Id. at 1121.
272. Id. at 1123.
273. Evidence in this regard included the testimony of several respondents who had entered into consent decrees, Customs officials who noted that the number of infringing games
was increasing, video game operators who informed Bally of copies in their areas, and complaints from Bally's distributors. Id.
274. Id. at 1125.
275. 49 Fed. Reg. 17827 (1984).
276. Certain Personal Computers and Components Thereof, USITC Pub. 1504, Inv. No.
337-TA-140, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1140 (1984) [hereinafter Apple Computers].
277. Autostart ROM is a derivative work based on a work entitled Apple II System Monitor which was separately registered. Apple failed to plead infringement of the Apple II System
Monitor copyright, thus raising the question whether the copyright in Autostart Rom was
limited to the new material distinguishing it from Apple II System Monitor. Citing Apple
Computers, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3rd Cir. 1983), Apple argued
that other courts had found infringement of the entire Autostart Rom program where only
that copyright was pleaded. The ITC managed to avoid the question by ruling that the issue of
the Apple II System Monitor program copyright was litigated with the implied consent of the
appearing respondents through the introduction of pertinent evidence without objection. Apple Computers, supra note 276.
278. Along with the "virtual identity" of the programs, the ITC found that all the respondents had access to the copyrighted works as they had been embodied in commercially available Apple computers for some time. Apple Computers, supra note 276.
279. "As a general rule, a contributory infringer is one who with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another...
However, where the contributory infringement is alleged to lie in the sale or distribution of an
article, it will not be found if that article is capable of commercially significant noninfringing
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motherboards which required ROMs containing the Apple programs in
order to operate.2 8 °
Since the product involved was the "complete personal computer,"
domestic industry was defined in such terms and included the labor and
resources involved in the following areas: R&D; engineering support;
manufacture and assembly of the keyboard; purchase from U.S. producers of custom integrated circuit chips, random access memory chips and
assorted hardware; and final assembly, testing, quality control, and packaging. Injury was established on the basis of consumer price sensitivity
to personal computers and the "substantially lower prices" of the infringing imports. As a result, the ITC issued a general exclusion order.2 81
3. Laurel Burch Jewelry

28 2

Laurel Burch, Inc. (LBI) filed a complaint alleging violation of section 337 through the importation and sale of cloisonne earrings 28 3 which
infringed nineteen registered copyrights. None of the named respondents
appeared at any time during the proceedings and LBI submitted a motion for summary determination. The copyrights were found to be valid
and infringed. 28 4 Although the cloisonne components were manufactured in Taiwan, the ALJ determined that the domestic production activities 28 5 and stringent quality control 28 6 composed over 50% of the
finished product's value. Substantial injury was established by evidence
uses. Of course, there must first be a finding that direct copyright infringement is occurring."
The respondents were unable to present sufficient probative evidence as to commercially significant noninfringing uses of the ROM-less motherboards and computers. Id.
280: The respondents would insert the infringing ROMs following importation of the
ROM-less computers and motherboards. This ruling was indeed a victory for Apple who,
"hampered by regulatory obstacles," had attempted to obtain the same ruling from the Customs Department earlier. Unfair Foreign Trade Practices,supra note 21, at 410 (testimony of
Gary Hecker, attorney, on behalf of Apple Computer, Inc.).
281. The order excluded from importation all personal computers and components that
directly infringed the copyrights as well as ROMless motherboards and computers "which can
be shown to be associated with imports of infringing ROMs or which are intended to receive
infringing ROMs in the United States." Apple Computers, supra note 276.
282. Certain Cloisonne Jewelry, USITC Pub. 1822, Inv. No. 337-TA-195, 7 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1955 (1986).
283. The earring designs were "highly stylized abstractions based upon personal interpretations of objects of nature, such as birds, plants and flowers." Id.
284. The infringing earrings were identical to Laurel Burch, Inc.'s (LBI) designs, but differed significantly in quality. LBI had arranged for the manufacture of the earrings in Taiwan;
the respondents included both the original Taiwanese manufacturers and North American
importers. Such evidence was held as proof of access. Id.
285. These included mounting and shaping post studs and earwires or clasps with all of the
required materials being purchased in the United States. Id.
286. "[C]omplainant engages in 100% inspection of every pair of cloisonne earrings." Id.
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of lost sales 287 and damage to LBI's reputation and goodwill.2 88 A general exclusion order was issued one year after the filing of the complaint.
4.

Gremlins

289

Warner Brothers, Inc. filed a complaint alleging a section 337 viola-

tion in the unauthorized importation and sale of products infringing
three of its copyrights in the characters from the movie Gremlins. The
ALJ identified two separate domestic industries: 290 one involving the
products in which the copyrights were incorporated and the other consisting of the actual licensing of the copyrights. 29 Although substantial
injury was not found in the product industry because the infringing products were not in competition with the domestically produced products,29 2
2 93
injury was found in the licensing industry.
The ITC reversed the part of the determination that found a domestic licensing industry existed, arguing that it "has never determined that
the servicing of intellectual property rights, as contrasted with the servicing of products, qualifies as the type of 'servicing' activity that may be
considered to be part of the domestic industry. ' 294 The action was therefore dismissed for lack of a section 337 violation.
287. Although the number of infringing imports could not be established (due to-nonappearance of respondents as well as importation from undefinable parties), it was estimated that
LBI was aware of only 10% of the total sales of the imports. However, even this 10% had a
significant impact on LBI's market; long standing customers ceased or reduced LBI purchases
and cancelled orders "in favor of purchasing the [significantly] lower cost imports." Id.
288. Having made "a concerted, and successful, effort to establish" a reputation as to quality, LBI was harmed by the poor quality of the imports which were passed off as LBI originals.
Id.
289. Certain Products with Gremlin Character Depictions, USITC Pub. 1815, ,Inv. No.
337-TA-201, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1585 (1986) [hereinafter Gremlins], aff'd sub nom.,
Warner Bros., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 787 F.2d 562 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
290. Warner licensed 48 domestic companies to produce products containing Gremlins
character depictions, with 31 of those companies engaging in manufacturing activities within
the United States. Approximately one-half of the Gremlins products royalty revenues resulted
from domestic manufacture. Gremlins, supra note 289.
291. Such industry included the marketing, financial and legal activities related to the licensing and legal protection of the Gremlin copyrights. The ALJ explained that Warner's
activities involved "far more than the usual activity of any inventor or copyright holder and is
part of an established industry ...[licensing is] an integral part of their original profit-making
domestic activity ...large sums of money are.invested in the planning of the licensing program
and significant personnel are utilized in developing and executing it .
I..."
Id.
292. The infringing imports consisted of inexpensive "souvenir" items such as key chains
and pins, whereas the domestic licensed products were higher priced "utilitarian" objects such
as clothing and school lunch boxes. Id.
293. "The presence of unauthorized infringing merchandise may endanger the overall marketing program because of a licensor's loss of control over product quality and safety." Id.
294. The ITC suggested that allowing Warner's licensing activities to constitute an industry would allow foreign manufacturers to be considered domestic industries based on extensive
marketing and legal activities (to protect the copyright) in the United States. These activities
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Section 337 Summary

The advantages of section 337 actions include speed, effective in rem
protection, and a forum generally favorable to complainants. The 1988
Trade Act has additionally benefited complainants by lessening the industry standard and deleting the injury requirement in intellectual property cases and by adding a default provision in case of non-appearance.
The result should be more predictable outcomes and lower costs.
The disadvantages of section 337 copyright actions include cost
(although costs should decrease following the changes in the industry
and injury requirements and the new default provision for nonappearing
respondents), the absence of damage awards, and the remote possibility
of a presidential veto following an affirmative determination. Most importantly, the predictability of section 337 actions-indeed, the continued existence of section 337 itself-may be in jeopardy following the
recent EC Report. If Congress refuses to amend section 337 to treat
products of both foreign and U.S. origin equivalently, international disapproval will steadily increase as more affirmative determinations lead to
further GATT complaints. Such disapproval, in conjunction with the
compromises required in negotiating the Uruguay Round or any new
multilateral trade treaty, could increase the possibility of retaliation
against, or significant trade concessions by, the United States. In an attempt to avoid additional stress in the international trade arena, section
337 could, therefore, be subjected to increased presidential disapproval as
well as strict and narrow interpretations of section 337 by the ITC.
Although Congress could grant section 337 powers to federal courts,
thus avoiding GATT charges of discriminatory treatment, this is unlikely
to occur in the near future.

IV
Conclusion
Foreign infringement of U.S. intellectual property rights continues
to grow along with revenue losses from such infringement, particularly
affecting copyright-dependent industries. Both sections 301 and 337 are
powerful tools which may be used to protect U.S. industry from inadequate intellectual property protection. The 1988 Trade Act strengthened
these trade-based remedies, making them extremely useful to U.S. industries, but have also intensified the possible international trade problems
associated with sections 337 and 301.
could be performed by an importer and Congress did not intend to protect the activities of
importers when it enacted § 337. Id.
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Sections 301 and 337 have typically been used separately to attack
different problems. This Note has suggested using the remedies in tandem and focusing on the prevention of revenue losses. The proposed
synthesis suggests that companies develop marketing strategies which include annual expenditures for section 301-based lobbying and negotiation
activities, possibly by participating in industry organizations working
with the USTR. Companies interested in expanding into, or marketing
in, particular nations should consult with the USTR and consider requesting informal section 301 discussions if current or future problems
emerge. Section 301 formal procedures or Super 301 petitions should be
reserved as a last resort; actions that function as a short-term curative
measure with high costs in terms of GATT conflicts and future trade
negotiations. If section 301 informal discussions are appropriate, such
procedures should continue following resolution of the immediate issue.
If infringing products are imported into the United States, section
337 actions should be instituted immediately. Particularly for copyright
infringement, section 337 has proven to be a quick and generally satisfactory method of halting infringement. Section 301 informal discussions
should be conducted in conjunction with a section 337 proceeding to enlist the support of the foreign infringer's government in ceasing the offending practices.
The loss-preventative synthesis is especially applicable for copyright-dependent industries where the ease of copying and the long-term
effects of lower-quality infringing copies makes quick curative and farreaching preventative measures necessary. Moreover, the existence of
copyright treaties, such as the Berne Convention and the Universal
Copyright Convention, have established copyright as a legitimate intellectual property right not subject to dispute, in comparison to newer
forms of intellectual property such as process patents. Thus, although
this synthesis may be used to combat other types of intellectual property
infringement, it will be most effective when used against copyright
infringement.
In conclusion, returning to our hypothetical computer software
company, the synthesis would suggest joining an industry organization,
such as the Computer Software and Services Industry Association or the
Business Software Association, at the time the company contemplates
international sales. The organization should be one which maintains discussions with the USTR, and thus has access to information regarding
the intellectual property policies of specific nations as well as the status of
any current negotiations. Upon realizing that foreign infringement is occurring, the company should contact the USTR to initiate informal section 301 discussions with the offending nation(s). If these proceedings
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prove unsatisfactory, the company may consider instituting formal section 301 proceedings or requesting Super 301 status for the nation, keeping in mind the USTR's recommendations as to the feasibility and longterm consequences of such actions. If the infringing products are imported into the United States, the company should immediately institute
section 337 proceedings, accompanied by informal section 301 discussions. These steps will help mitigate current, as well as prevent future,
revenue losses. Moreover, this synthesis decreases the possibility of
GATT conflicts, and allows the development of other multilateral and/
or bilateral intellectual property agreements more hospitable to U.S.
business interests.

